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Abstract
Policymakers in OECD countries regularly cite reducing political violence as a fundamental
purpose of foreign aid. For example, countries such as Pakistan and Iraq have received
considerable amounts of aid meant to address the root causes of political violence. This project
analyzes quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess whether foreign aid can reduce
political violence. The quantitative and qualitative analyses study Boko Haram in Nigeria and the
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone to focus on regional and country-wide political
violence. The study further focuses on aid projects in Sierra Leone and Nigeria as a means to
reduce or curb this violence. This paper finds evidence for aid projects playing a significant role
in reducing political violence or reconsolidating a country after a conflict. However, this is
highly contingent on the projects addressing and adequately understanding the needs in these
countries.
Note: This honors thesis began as a Ursinus College Summer Fellows project in June/July 2018.
Sections on the following pages are taken from Rohrer (2018): pgs. 7, 14-16, 22
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Introduction
Foreign aid has been an essential tool to combat terrorism and political violence at least
since World War II (USAID 2017). It has become an integral component of efforts to combat
terrorism and political violence (Young & Findley 2011). The United States, as well as other
OECD countries, provide substantial foreign aid to countries with a high number of terrorist
incidents such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq based on the assumption that doing so will
reduce political violence and advance post-conflict reconciliation. However, there is no
consensus within the existing scholarship on the effects of foreign aid. Some scholars argue that
foreign aid decreases political violence while others argue that foreign aid increases political
violence. This paper weighs in on this debate by studying the impact of foreign aid on political
violence in the specific cases of Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The study includes both qualitative
and quantitative analysis. The qualitative study researches the impact of aid projects on terrorism
and overall human well-being in Nigeria as well as on post-conflict reconciliation after the Sierra
Leonean civil war. The quantitative study focuses on descriptive statistics and local data in both
cases.
Can aid reduce political violence? Existing literature
Why people engage in political violence: Theories on relative deprivation
When studying the relationship between aid and political violence, it is key to understand
why people engage in political violence before investigating whether and how foreign aid may
mitigate violence. This section, therefore, focuses on leading theories on the motivation and
grievances of people participating in political violence. Identifying the root causes of political
violence would help develop targeted policy and development projects to curb these motivations
and grievances, yet theoretical and empirical studies on the causes of political violence identify
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different root causes. While there is a common focus on relative deprivation, scholars disagree
about whether economic deprivation or discrimination along ethnic or religious lines is more
important. In addition, scholars differ on the question of whether political violence is associated
with poverty and weak state capacity or if the availability of resources increases incentives and
opportunities for rebellion. Finally, other scholars argue that any account of political violence
should examine subnational differences in economic and other grievances.
The most widely known and influential scholar on the sources of political violence is Ted
Robert Gurr, whose 1970 book “Why Men Rebel” is considered a landmark work in political
science and is still highly relevant. According to Gurr (1970, 20-23), to understand political
violence, the individual has to be understood. Gurr’s argument primarily argues that relative
deprivation refers to a gap between expectations and what people actually receive. He argues that
the primary source of violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Once the expectation
and reality of an individual do not match, this individual is more likely to rebel (Gurr 1970, 2325).
Gurr distinguishes between three forms of relative deprivation that can all lead to
political violence. The first form of relative deprivation is decremental deprivation. In
decremental deprivation, people become angered and violent as their value expectations stay the
same, but their value capabilities decrease. In other words, the loss of what they once had or
thought they had can lead to violence. An example of this kind of deprivation is when
immigrants take over unskilled jobs, lowering job prospects for native-born unskilled workers
(Gurr 1970, 46). The second form is aspirational deprivation. In this form of deprivation, the
value capabilities stay the same while expectations rise. In this case, people feel they have no
way or means of attaining their new goals, leading them to be angered. Lastly, the third form of
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relative deprivation is progressive deprivation. In this form, value expectations increase with
value capabilities at first, until value capabilities decrease and expectations keep increasing. For
instance, when people get used to long-term, continued improvements in their lives and these
suddenly come to a halt, people have trouble adjusting their expectations. This can happen after
an economic depression in a growing economy (Gurr 1970, 52). The relative deprivation
hypothesis, however, is based on the perception of the individual, which an outsider may not see
or perceive differently (Gurr 1970, 24).
According to Gurr, it is essential to understand someone’s grievances to comprehend
their actions. To recognize these grievances, we must study people’s social and economic status
and their perception of it (Gurr 2011). In the end, all these factors impact each other. For
instance, understanding a group’s beliefs and ideologies can shed light on their mobilization
processes. Once these beliefs and ideologies are understood, the role of government becomes
essential. According to Gurr, governments that respond to grievances with new policies are often
not targets of political violence. This is because they can recognize these grievances and respond
to them before they become a bigger problem. Therefore, the government can be the key to
causing or solving a conflict.
In more concrete detail, many factors such as ethnic, economic and political deprivation
can cause relative deprivation. For instance, economic grievances of particularly marginalized
groups can increase terrorism and may be stronger in marginalized groups (Piazza 2011, 339).
Piazza also finds that ethnic disparities, as well as economic disparities, go hand in hand.
Similarly, Ghatak and Gold (2017) find that minority discrimination may lead members of
aggrieved groups to join or support terrorist organizations when they are excluded from public
goods. This is also likely when minority groups are excluded from the political system and
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denied opportunities to redress their grievances there. In an extensive study of terrorism in 130
countries between 1981-2005, Choi and Piazza (2014) find that the exclusion of ethnic groups
from political power is strongly associated with an increase in domestic terrorist attacks (Choi
and Piazza 2014). The lack of political opportunity as well as unresponsive institutions may
increase political violence as well (Crenshaw 1981, 384). Government oppression leaves less
opportunity for citizens to exercise rights and air grievances through channels such as the courts
or protests (Piazza 2017, 105; Krueger 2007; Crenshaw 1981, 384) which makes political
violence a last resort (Krueger 2007, Crenshaw 1981, Li 2005, Choi 2010).
These grievances and motivations for participating in political violence are difficult to
pinpoint in an individual or group; however, socioeconomic conditions such as lack of education,
poverty or repression help recognize individual motivation and underlying causes of violence.
Aid projects can then help curb circumstances that create grievances.
Why people engage in political violence: Theories on religious and ethnic motivation
Political violence is also commonly attributed to religious and ethnic motivations or
flares up around ethnic or religious lines. For example, 64 % of civil wars to date have had a
component of ethnic or religious conflict. However, most ethnic groups have not experienced a
civil war (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 1-8). Conflicts that appear to be ethnic or religious
often have other underlying factors. For example, the conflict in Ukraine is fought as an ethnic
conflict while motivations are economical. Political violence can appear around ethnic or
religious lines, with underlying factors such as grievances. This marks an essential difference in
the motivation of political violence. A conflict merely motivated by religion or ethnicity are
complicated to address and alleviating grievances, in this case, would not help. Grievances,
however, can flare up around one ethnicity or religion as they often experience the same political
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or economic struggles. It is therefore vital to understand the difference between violence
motivated by grievances forming around one religion or ethnicity or violence motivated by
ethnicity or religion. This becomes especially hard to assess as both forms of political violence
use ethnicity and religion for recruiting. Religion or ethnicity may simplify recruiting for violent
groups because people of the same ethnic group or religion tend to live close together and share
the same identity (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 10-12). Along those lines, religious or ethnic
cohesion within a group makes it easier to retain members in the group and to ensure allegiance.
After a civil war, it is also essential to understand how political violence can be
prohibited in the future. If political violence were only motivated by religion or ethnicity,
curbing more political violence would be nearly impossible. However, as ethnicity and religion
only frame the underlying cause, such as grievances, post-conflict reconciliation becomes vital.
Ensuring equal political and economic opportunity after a civil war, for instance, can make the
difference between a second civil war and a peaceful country (Cunningham and Seymour 2016,
15-16). The argument of religion and ethnicity has received much traction in recent years, mainly
through the media. However, grievances one experiences rather motivated political violence than
religion and ethnicity itself.
Why groups engage in political violence: Theories on opportunity costs
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that rebellions are more commonly associated with
greed rather than grievance and they point to their empirical finding that the availability of
certain natural resources (oil, diamonds) increase the likelihood and duration of the conflict.
Such resources may make the state a lucrative prize for capture, especially in poorer countries
where low average income decreases the opportunity costs for would-be rebels. Collier and
Hoeffler argue that grievances are generally not strong enough to trigger conflict so that the
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opportunity cost of initiating and sustaining conflict becomes decisive. Natural resource wealth
can be used to reduce opportunity costs and finance rebellions.
Why groups engage in political violence: Theories on subnational inequality
Whereas Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation “implies that grievance-induced discontent
because of the marginalization of certain groups is a major determinant of violent political
mobilization [but] … inequality is among the grievance factors largely dismissed by recent largeN country-level studies of civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004 and Fearon and Laitin
2003),” (Hegre et al. 2009, 602). Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh call for studies of the neglect of the
group aspect of inequality. They forward a “horizontal inequality argument” that states that
inequalities coinciding with regional differences and cultural cleavages may enhance group
grievances and increase political violence. Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh propose that the poverty or
deprivation of subnational groups relative to other groups in the population may be more
important for their support of rebel movements than their absolute poverty: “Support can thus
derive from an unequal geographical distribution of welfare. The local population is likely to feel
frustration and antagonism, especially when their deprivation is the result of the government’s
exploitation and discrimination” (Hegre et al. 2009, 603).
Theories on the relationship between foreign aid and political violence
Literature assessing the impact of foreign aid on political violence can be broken down in
two schools of thought. One school of thought describes aid as a tool used to prop up one side in
a conflict, thus increasing political violence (Azam 1995 and Grossman 1991/1992). In his
theoretical argument, Azam (1995) cites proxy civil wars supported by the United States and
USSR through aid. He argues that these two former superpowers ignited political violence
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through aid to fight the Cold War on foreign territory (Azam 1995, 174). Azam finds that
political violence can be mitigated by sharing spoils to opponents of the ruling government as
well as redistributing funds across regions (Azam 1995, 174). Foreign aid can have an essential
role in distributing these spoils who can have an impact on decreasing violence. Through these
spoils, incentives decrease which in turn mitigate the emergence of political violence (Azam
1995, 174). Grossman (1991/1992) argues that aid can increase political violence as it increases
possible payoffs. Grossman’s research demonstrates that rebels become dissatisfied with payoffs
from the government and seek violence to capture the aid, instead of settling for payoffs.
Meanwhile, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that aid decreases political violence. They
claim that aid can prevent civil wars through increasing economic growth and military capacity
as well as reducing the reliance on primary commodity exports. By reallocating funds to
underfunded sectors in a country, aid can further alleviate political violence.
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Economic grievances and their role in political violence
In line with Gurr’s relative deprivation theory discussed above, economic deprivation can
have a grave impact on political violence and a number of scholarly studies point to poverty,
poor economic growth and economic discrimination as the leading cause of terrorism and other
forms of political violence (Piazza 2011, 339; Krueger 2007; Crenshaw 1981, 384). Piazza, for
instance, finds that economic grievances of particularly marginalized groups can increase
terrorism (Piazza 2011, 339). In a related argument, Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana find that
high-income, democratic countries can experience an increase in terrorism when faced with
economic contractions, as terrorists find it more promising to engage in terrorism at those times
(Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana 2004, 463-477). Hegre et al. (2009) discuss the scholarly
argument that there is a direct link from economic development to domestic peace. The authors
find that relatively wealthy areas played a more significant role in the Liberian civil war than
relatively poor areas. For instance, rebel groups continuously recruited from the same wealthy
areas in Liberia (Hegre et al. 2009, 619-620). This is interesting as the argument concerning
economic development and political violence usually links poverty to the recruitment of the
terrorists and fighters. However, Hegre et al. scholarship show that recruitment can happen from
wealthy areas just as much. The authors note that their findings tend to support the opportunity
arguments of scholars like Collier and Hoeffler; however, they also note that the Liberian
government had minimal capacity at this time.
Aid, economic growth and economic shocks
To address economic grievances that lead to forms of political violence such as terrorism,
economic growth can be a useful tool. Savun and Tirone (2012) argue that aid can dampen the
effects of economic shocks on the economy and therefore the population. They use Collier and
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Hoeffler’s (2002) argument that aid can decrease political violence and instability indirectly by
increasing economic growth and reducing dependence on primary commodity exports (Savun
and Tirone 2012, 370). Savun and Tirone find that even a little increase in aid can have an
enormous effect on political and economic stability. They find that foreign aid can help sustain a
certain level of national spending to maintain institutions while these countries go through times
of economic hardship (Savun and Tirone 2012, 389). Some scholars highlight additional revenue
from foreign aid as a valuable tool in rebuilding a country’s economy and to reducing economic
grievances by increasing economic growth. Scholars such as Hadjimichael et al. (1995) find that
foreign aid indeed does have a positive effect on economic growth using a cross-national study
(Hadjimichael et al. 1995, 610). These studies, therefore, suggest that economic growth can have
a considerable positive impact reducing political violence.
Aid, political violence and politics
Aid and Political grievances
While economic grievances are a critical factor to keep in mind when studying the impact
of foreign aid on political violence, political grievances and oppression should be kept in mind as
well. Political grievances can include the lack of representation of a specific ethnic group, lack of
political rights such as exercising the right to vote or even a lack of the rule of law. Studies
focused on the effectiveness of specific foreign aid launched through organizations like USAID
or World Bank in redressing grievances have found mixed results. For example, an evaluation of
INVEST, a program that provided Afghan youth with training as well as cash, found that this aid
reduced the recipients’ willingness to back the Taliban. However, recipients who only received
training did not have an impact, and those who only received cash proved were more likely to
back the Taliban (Lyall et al. 2018, 10-15, 18). USAID reports have shown that some projects
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aimed at reducing terrorism target the wrong people. An evaluation of the Tunisia Transition
Initiative showed that the program did not target youth at risk of joining terrorist networks or
engaging in political violence (USAID 2014). This shows that while foreign aid can address
economic grievances, political violence may persist due to political grievances.
Aid and the role of institutions and poverty
Research on the effectiveness of foreign aid in combatting poverty and reducing political
violence suggests that foreign aid does not necessarily achieve these goals. On the one hand,
foreign aid may not be effective in helping the poor. On the other hand, alleviating poverty may
not address other causes of political violence. Nonetheless, there is a reason to explore the
impact of foreign aid on terrorism further. As von Hippel notes, a number of extremist groups
have been able to broaden their appeal by providing the poor with social services such as schools
and hospitals; lack of government-provided services and international donor support create an
opening for such groups by leaving marginalized communities vulnerable and susceptible to
extremist appeals (von Hippel 2010, 53-55). In addition, while terrorist leaders often come from
the ranks of middle and upper classes, poor education and poverty have convinced (or pressured)
ordinary foot soldiers to join terrorist organizations (von Hippel 2010, 56-60). Nevertheless,
foreign aid and development projects can have a more profound impact in a community beyond
merely addressing poverty. Foreign aid and development projects can strengthen institutions by
alleviating problems such as lack of representation or difficulties with the rule of law, or
community-based projects can be implemented, promoting cooperation across different ethnic
and socio-economic groups.

17
The role of aid in post-conflict reconciliation
Donors are not only focused on states currently experiencing political violence but also
on post-conflict nations. Poor institutions and socio-economic structures are often all a country is
left with after experiencing conflict or political violence (Mlambo 2009). Aid can become
significant in post-conflict reconciliation and community building. Most of these programs are
focused on improving institutions to aid in social reconciliation (Fearon et al. 2009, 287). Fearon
et al. study the effects these programs have on social interactions and the community and find
that they can have a substantial impact. Development aid post-conflict can introduce and alter
patterns of social cooperation even after these programs have concluded (Fearon et al. 2009,
291). Foreign aid can also become vital in post-conflict reconciliation by aiding in poverty
reduction. Poverty is another instance of relative deprivation and can lead to economic
grievances (Chayes 2016). However, these conflicts often leave damaged institutions behind,
meaning they need to be rebuilt first to reconstruct the state (Mlambo 2009, 58-59). While
rebuilding the country and during post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, it has proven
effective to focus on rebuilding the state and its institutions, renewing the economy and
rehabilitating communities (Mlambo 2009, 61). Foreign aid can play a vital role as long as it is
tailored to the country’s needs and aims to rebuild pivotal institutions (Mlambo 2009, 65).

18
Negative effects of aid
Aid increases the duration of political violence
On the other hand, aid has sometimes been found to worsen political violence and may
increase the frequency of violent engagements between rebels and the government (Narang
2015, Strandow et al. 2016, Wood and Molfino 2016). This can happen as foreign aid increases
uncertainty about the relative strength on both sides of a conflict, which in turn prolongs civil
wars. In particular, dispersed aid is more likely to cause dispersed, irregular conflict, while
centralized aid is more likely to contribute to current territorial disputes (Strandow et al. 2016).
The different types of aid matter as well, as humanitarian aid shows an increase in political
violence, while other types of aid do not (Wood and Molfino 2016). For instance, food aid does
not have a negative effect on conflict. The impact of aid on the duration of political violence is
also bound to timing (Dippold 2016, viii). Dippold finds that the provision of emergency aid can
increase localized conflict while non-emergency aid does not. Therefore, a sudden spurt in aid
may increase political violence.
Is foreign aid effective in the presence of corruption?
Some scholars argue that foreign aid may not be as effective as intended, as corruption
and lack of accountability plagues many receiving countries (Knack 2004, Winters 2010, Eubank
2011). This is important to consider, as countries that experience political violence may also be
susceptible to corruption, impacting the effectiveness of aid. Accountability of the government is
essential to establish institutions supporting foreign aid (Winters 2010, 218). Skeptics of foreign
aid argue that it reduces governments’ need to rely on their citizens for tax revenues, raising the
same kind of problem with rentier states that has been applied to oil-rich authoritarian
governments (Moyo 2009). In turn, this reduces accountability, as citizens lose power they can
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exercise through taxation (Eubank 2011, 465). Much like the natural resource curse, scholars
have found a negative connection between foreign aid, democracy, and economic growth. The
aid curse implies that foreign aid hinders nations from democratizing or improving economic
growth, the exact opposite effect foreign aid is intended to have. Some scholars such as Djankov
argue that the aid curse is bigger than the natural resource curse, creating even more obstacles to
democracy and economic growth than oil (Djankov 2008, 169). Similarly, Knack’s (2000) crosscountry research suggests that higher aid levels reduce the quality of governance and in turn hurt
growth (Knack 2000, 20). Alesina and Weder (1999) found that more corrupt governments
receive more foreign aid, while this aid is not able to reduce corruption.
However, other studies show that foreign aid may lessen corruption assuming that
countries do not start with high levels of corruption and can provide necessary institutions
(Okada & Samreth 2012, 240). Tying aid to the implementation of specific rules and imposing
conditionalities may be able to lessen corruption if these rules and conditions require more
transparency (Tavares 2002, 104). Thus, regime types and institutions in place can mitigate the
aid curse (Collier 2007, 103). According to Collier as well as Burnside and Dollar (1997), aid
has shown to be more effective in nations where governance and policies are already sound
(Collier 2007, 103; Burnside and Dollar 1997, 4). Harford and Klein (2005) discuss the
possibility of bringing in the private sector to ensure the full-intended effects of foreign aid in the
recipient countries (Harford and Klein 2005).
While the apparent effect of corruption is that foreign aid does not have its intended
impact on the economy, it can have even more dangerous effects on terrorism and political
violence overall. Corruption in a country may have adverse effects on terrorism and political
violence. Corruption may exacerbate poverty and increase income inequalities, fueling economic
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grievances that can lead to political violence, as discussed above. Therefore, corruption affecting
aid can implicate and increase violence, although intended to decrease it.
Summaries of theory-generating literature
Table 1: Theory generating literature

Authors
Nielsen et al.

Year
2011

Strange et al.

Title
Foreign aid shocks as a
cause of violent armed
conflict
Tracking underreported
financial flows: China’s
development finance and
the aid–conflict nexus
revisited

Savun &
Tirone

Exogenous shocks, foreign
aid, and civil war

2012

Narang

Assisting uncertainty: how
humanitarian aid can
inadvertently prolong civil
war
(When) Do antipoverty
programs reduce violence?
India's rural employment
guarantee and Maoist
conflict
Does aid cause conflict in
Pakistan

2015

Foreign aid and the
intensity of violent armed
conflict

2016

Dasgupta et
al.

Tahir

Strandow et
al.

2017

Summary of Main Findings
aid shocks can have negative effects on
political violence and lead to outbreak of
armed conflict
Chinese development aid provides an
alternative when ‘traditional’ funding is
withdrawn, therefore conflict decreases.
This research highlights the importance
of understanding alternative aid to
understanding aid and conflict.
foreign aid is essential in sustaining a
certain level of spending if and while
countries go through economic hardship
foreign aid increases uncertainty of each
combatant’s strength prolonging civil war

2017

poverty reduction can address political
violence when sound institutions are in
place

2017

mixed results, finding a positive
relationship between aid on terrorism
however no relationship between aid and
armed conflict
the increase in foreign aid increases
political violence. Dispersed foreign aid
causes dispersed, irregular conflict while
concentrated aid contributes to
conventional territorial battles
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Theory
Basics of relative deprivation and its forms
The emergence of political violence and relative deprivation are often tied together (Gurr
1970, 8). Relative deprivation happens once the expectation and reality of an individual clash
and no longer match (Gurr 1970, 15). This deprivation, however, is based on the individual and
their perception. There are three different forms of relative deprivation, which are decremental
deprivation, aspirational deprivation, progressive deprivation. The first form of relative
deprivation is decremental deprivation. In decremental deprivation people become angered and
violent as their expectations stay the same, but their capabilities decrease. Expectations of an
individual can range from anything like the belief of achieving something in particular to what
they believe they are entitled to have. Capabilities, however, reflect the real outcome. In other
words, the loss of what they once had or thought they had can lead to violence. This can be seen
in a society when a status quo can no longer be attained, such as a decline in the capabilities of
the political elite or economic output (Gurr 1970, 46). The second form is aspirational
deprivation. In this form of deprivation, the value capabilities stay the same while expectations
rise. In this case, people feel they have no way or means of attaining their new goals, which
angers them. This can manifest itself when a new political order or justice is sought after or also
in the form of greed, wanting to have more material goods (Gurr 1970, 50). Lastly, the third form
of relative deprivation is progressive deprivation. In this form value expectations increase with
value capabilities at first, until value capabilities decrease and expectations keep increasing. For
instance, when a long run continued improvement in people’s life suddenly comes to a halt,
people have trouble adjusting their increasing expectations. This can happen after an economic
depression in a growing economy (Gurr 1970, 52). These forms of deprivation are essential to
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keep in mind as the groundwork for political violence. Aid can be successful in mitigating these
forms of relative deprivation, both at different phases of violent political contestation.
Relative deprivation and aid
Relative deprivation can arise from different instances. It can occur when economic or
political opportunities decrease, increase and then decrease or when they were never there. Aid
can mitigate these instances by increasing economic rights and growth and political rights. This,
violence can be decreased by mitigating relative deprivation (Gurr 1970, 3-12). One argument
therefore is that foreign aid decreases political violence as it opens up opportunities for economic
growth, helps countries sustain spending levels during economic hardship and helps alleviate
oppression and create social programs (Savun and Tirone 2012, Collier and Hoeffler 2002,
Hadjimichael 1995, Collier 2007, Lyall et al. 2018, von Hippel 2010).
Nevertheless, aid can have negative effects and therefore increase political violence
instead. Foreign aid may fail to meet its intended effects due to corruption or prolong civil wars
as it increases uncertainty (Winters 2010, Knack 2004, Eubank 2011, Narang 2015, Strandow et
al. 2016). Therefore, the contrasting and second hypothesis is that foreign aid increases violent
mobilization.
Relative deprivation after a conflict
After a conflict relative deprivation can still be present or be in the process of emerging.
Poor institutions and socio-economic structures is a major struggle for many countries after a
conflict (Mlambo 2009). Deprivation can be caused by the lack of or dysfunctional institutions, a
political process, and a sound economic system. Conflicts also often destroy communities,
depriving individuals of social interactions and a safe community (Mlambo 2009). Institutions
most affected often include political authority and a sound economic system as well as necessary
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infrastructure. Aid programs post-conflict can help rebuild institutions, revive the economic
system and help integrate communities (Mlambo 2009). After this, these programs can develop
and create economic growth, political rights but also social stability and the rule of law. These
factors are all vital in post-conflict reconciliation as these programs can help alleviate
deprivation and prevent future conflicts. Foreign aid can, in turn, fail to reconstruct a country and
alleviate future violent engagements when aid project implementation is done incorrectly and
country specific details are ignored (Grant 2005, Fearon et al. 2009).
Hypotheses
The theoretical arguments outlined above lead to the following hypotheses.
H1: Comparing countries that do and do not receive foreign aid, those that receive more aid see
less political violence when aid generates economic growth, political rights and a strengthened
rule of law.
H2: Comparing countries that do and do not receive foreign aid, those that receive more aid see
an increase in the prevention of future violent engagement by rebuilding institutions, reviving the
economic system and re-integrating communities.
Research Design
Sierra Leone and Nigeria: The cases
This research includes a qualitative and quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis
examines Sierra Leone and Nigeria as case studies to assess the relationship statistically as well
as beyond the data and to investigate case evidence. The level of analysis for this is the country
as well as specific regions. The qualitative analysis of each case examines different aspects of
aid. The case of Sierra Leone studies aid as a tool for post-conflict reconstruction and

24
reconciliation. The case of Nigeria studies aid as the means to reduce or prevent political
violence. Both countries suffer from poverty, making foreign aid a central tool to address such
grievances. Nigeria and Sierra Leone have one of the highest poverty rankings in the world. In
Nigeria, about half of the population lives in poverty (Adebayo 2018). In Sierra Leone, sixty
percent live below the poverty line (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Both states have suffered from
political violence and grave death tolls as a result of it. Researchers estimate the death toll of
political violence in Sierra Leone between 1989 and 2013 to exceed 20,000 people as of 2013
(Sundberg and Melander 2013). Another, more recent source estimates the death toll to be
around 50,000 (Thomas 2018). Similarly, researchers estimate the death toll of political violence
in Nigeria between 1989 and 2013 to exceed 50,000 people. More recent estimates suggest the
death toll be around 60,000 people for the time period of 2011 to 2019 (Campbell 2019).
However, Sierra Leone and Nigeria are distinct in two aspects. While Nigeria is currently
struggling with terrorism, Sierra Leone is moving towards a more stable future. Sierra Leone is
becoming freer, at least statistically speaking. In 2001 Freedom House score was partly free with
individual scores of 4.5 out of 7, seven being the worst, in freedom rating, 5 in civil liberties and
4 in political rights (Freedom House 2001). In 2018 these scores had improved with 3 out of 7, in
freedom rating, civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House 2018).
Additionally, GDP per capita in Sierra Leone has increased since 2001. In 2001 the GDP
per capita in Sierra Leone was 230.09$, and in 2017 it was 499.42$ (World Bank FRED
Database 2018). For the purpose of this study, I study the onset of political violence in Nigeria
and post-conflict reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Nigeria has suffered from political violence in
the forms of terrorism. Starting in 2009 the terrorist organization Boko Haram began to use
violent tactics (Felter 2018). 2009 marked the first significant incident by Boko Haram with an
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armed uprising as the result of police crackdowns (Felter 2018). Boko Haram is not only
responsible for kidnappings and terrorist attacks but also insurgency and controlling territory
(Felter 2018).
Meanwhile, Sierra Leone has suffered from political violence in the past, with no recent
events after 2002/2003 (Sundberg and Melander 2013). The main perpetrator of political
violence in Sierra Leone was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF was not only
responsible for starting the Sierra Leonean civil war but also for the illegal trade of conflict
diamonds, used to finance the civil war as well as using child soldiers during the war (Brummel
2006). Studying post-conflict relations in Sierra Leone may be crucial to study the effect aid has
on post-conflict reconciliation. In addition, natural resources such as the diamond trade in Sierra
Leone may contribute heavily to economic growth.
Quantitative Analysis
While the hypotheses only point towards a country-wide study the quantitative analysis
examines variation within countries. The quantitative analysis focuses more specifically on a
regional analysis and national analysis. The regional analysis focuses on local differences
between foreign aid and political violence in certain regions. This is mostly achieved through a
description of spatial patterns in aid and violence.
Meanwhile, the national analysis focuses on the overall question of the impact of foreign
aid on violence and is analyzed using descriptive statistics. Both analyses study Nigeria and
Sierra Leone starting in 1990 and continuing to 2014. This period is able to incorporate the full
period of the Sierra Leonean civil war, which ranged from 1991 to 2002, as well as Boko Haram
activity which was founded in the 1990s.
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Data & Methodology
To examine the relationship between foreign aid and political violence, the quantitative
analysis uses several databases combined into one dataset. To put together a quantitative analysis
that I could study, I needed data that measured foreign aid and political violence, on the national
and regional level. To operationalize foreign aid, I chose to utilize the dataset AidData. I chose
AidData, as it records all amounts of multilateral and bilateral aid including but not limited to
non-governmental organizations or multilateral organizations (Tierney et al. 2011). AidData
includes aid flow as reported from the donor perspective and is the most comprehensive database
on foreign aid and development finance (Tierney et al. 2011).
Further, I chose AidData as it included comprehensive and detailed spatial information
about aid projects and transactions both on the regional as well as national level. The unit of
measurement for AidData is the amount of aid given to a country in a given year in U.S. dollars,
and the data ranges from 1947 to 2013. The variable of projects was chosen as it directly relates
to the qualitative analysis, focusing on individual projects. Projects are also able to give us a
different idea on resources put into the country, apart from monetary. However, the variable
transactions were still incorporated to understand the amount of money flowing into one country
and its impact. For the purpose of this research, three different AidData datasets are used. One,
the core research release which details aid from one organization or country to another country.
The other two datasets specifically record the amount of aid in the provinces and states of Sierra
Leone and Nigeria. In order to understand the impact of aid on the local level, these different
datasets are used.
In order to test the amount of political violence, this research uses both the UCDP and
ACLED databases. The ACLED database includes battles, violence against civilians, remote
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violence, protests, riots as well as non-violent events. The unit of measurement of the database is
the single event, and the database ranges from 1997 to 2018. The ACLED is the most
comprehensive database on political violence, which is why it was chosen. For the purpose of
this study, these datasets include the UCDP dataset, which also analyzes the single event of
political violence (Croicu and Sundberg 2017). The UCDP includes political violence events
starting in 1975 and is, therefore, able to encompass the temporal parameters further. The dataset
breaks down events of political violence as non-state violence, one-sided violence as well as
state-based violence. In order to operationalize the study, the number of events was studied as a
variable. I chose this variable as it can tell us more about the terrorist's motivation of how often
they choose to strike and when.
Variables
Concept Studied
Political Violence
Foreign Aid

Variable
Violent Events
(count)
Aid given to a
country in a year
(in million U.S $),
projects in a year

Variable Type
dependent

Database
ACLED, UCDP

independent

AidData

Table 2: Variables in quantitative study

Dependent Variable
The primary dependent variable of interest is domestic political violence. For the purpose
of this paper, political violence is defined as the use of force for political reasons by non-state
actors. The ACLED definition of political violence informs this definition: “(…) the use of force
by a group with a political purpose or motivation. ACLED defines political violence through its
constituent events, the intent of which is to produce a comprehensive overview of all forms of
political disorder, expressed through violence and demonstrations, within and across states. A
politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups
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toward a political end” (ACLED 2017). This definition is taken from the ACLED codebook to
have a cohesive definition throughout the project, matching with the events coded in the ACLED
database. The ACLED definition is also coherent with the definition of the UCDP, the other
database used to study political violence.
Further, the ACLED codebook also mentions non-violent instances included in the
dataset “to capture the potential pre-cursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict” (ACLED
2017). However, these non-violent instances are not included in this research as they do not fit
the definition of “the use of force (…)”. This decision was made as the research aims to identify
the initial relationship between aid and the event of political violence and how this relationship
can help alleviate political violence and post-conflict reconciliation. The definition for this
research does not include state violence. I chose to omit state violence, as the goal of this
research paper is to understand the effects individual aid projects and aid can have on a country
and its people and therefore also its terror organizations. State violence does not fall under this as
they often do not experience the same amount of grievances as the general population. The
purpose of this research is to study the effect of aid on the initial emergence of political violence
as well as post-conflict resolution. State violence is often perpetuated in response to this initial
emergence of non-state violence instead of the initial factor. The effect aid can have on ending
conflict is greater than it can have on ending state violence.
For the purpose of this research, defining the instance of an event is essential as it is used
as the unit of measurement in both the UCDP as well as ACLED databases. The UCDP database
defines an event as “an incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against
another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific
location and a specific date” (Croicu and Sundberg 2017).
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Independent Variable
In order to assess the role of foreign aid and other variables in explaining increased or
decreased political violence, I use the amount of money that countries receive in developmental
assistance as my primary independent variable. To measure this, I use indicators from AidData,
the most comprehensive as well as an updated source of data on foreign aid, with commitment
information for over 1.5 million developmental finance activities between the years 1947 and
2016 (Tierney et al. 2011). This dataset includes data from 96 donors and includes official
developmental assistance (ODA), other official flows (OOF), equity investments as well as
export credits. ODA, as used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
includes all aid undertaken by official sectors that are intended for economic development and
given under concessional financial terms. The OECD defines ODA as “Official development
assistance (ODA) is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development
and welfare of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded from
ODA. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channeled through a
multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. The aid includes
grants, "soft" loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of the total) and the provision of
technical assistance." (OECD 2018). OOF refers to official flows to developing countries that do
not meet the criteria of ODA since they are not necessarily designed to promote economic
development or given under concessional financial terms. Equity investments refer to money
invested in a firm by stockholders with no return in normal business course and export credits
offer a financing arrangement provided to foreign buyers to assist in the purchase of goods and
services from national exporters.
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This study uses descriptive univariate statistics instead of correlations between aid and
violence. Descriptive statistics are used in this case to further explore the extent of aid, projects,
and violent events as well as to understand the average of such in a year further. While
regression analysis is used to study the relationship between two variables, using this analysis
does not lend itself to this study. However, the regression analysis would raise some problems.
While regression analysis can study short term and long-term effects, this would go beyond the
scope of this paper. Therefore, using regression without accounting for short-term and long-term
effects would leave this project with limitations in terms of temporal parameters, leaving the
study unable to define the temporal impact of aid on violence. This would leave the study with
problems of which events to include or which to omit, as they are connected to the year, they
occurred in. In addition, a regression would be unable to account for regional research such as
looking at spillover of aid into different states or regions. All these questions and problems could
be answered with different statistical tools, however for the purpose of and the scope of this
research I decided to describe basic patterns of the relationship and then explore the possible
impact of some projects in the qualitative analysis.
Qualitative Analysis
In addition to the quantitative analysis, this research also encompasses a qualitative
analysis. Sierra Leone suffered from the civil war from 1991-2002, while Nigeria suffers from
the violent activities of Boko Haram currently. The qualitative analysis includes temporal
parameters from 1990 to 2018. The temporal parameters in the qualitative analysis encompass
more years as the availability of quantitative data does not constrain the analysis. A comparative
analysis and regional analysis are used to study the cases of Sierra Leone and Nigeria. The
variant (or variable studied) in this analysis is the amount of foreign aid and its impact on
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political violence and post-conflict resolutions. The qualitative analysis aims to analyze
grievances levels pre, during and post-conflict. These levels can be poverty levels, GDP per
capita or ethnic grievances. The emergence of the RUF in Sierra Leone and the eventual end of
the conflict is studied with regards to the impact of aid in both the beginning and end of the
conflict.
Background on Case Studies
Motivation of Boko Haram Members
The biggest pool of recruits for Boko Haram consist of young boys that either attend
Islamic school or no school at all. Nigeria has the highest number of non-enrolled school
children with 70 % of the population illiterate and one in three schoolchildren not going to
school. This is especially grave in Northern states (Comolli 2015, 70). Many almajirai, or boys
that have attended Islamic school end up as recruits for Boko Haram. This is mostly due to the
lack of opportunity both for employment and higher education, as the education in these school
solely focuses on memorizing the Qur’an.
Further, this materializes and progresses when these youths find themselves in
complicated financial situations (Comolli 2015, 73). Interviews with young Boko Haram recruits
show that they are all at least partly motivated by financial compensation or for financial reasons
(Comolli 2015, 78). A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report shows that stark
levels of unemployment, as well as economic need, often play a significant role in the
recruitment of new members. While economic factors are not the tipping point for recruits, it
certainly aids terrorist organizations in recruiting (UNDP 2017, 55). Boko Haram is also active
in neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and even Mali. State officials of
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Nigeria state that most Boko Haram members today are foreign nationals (Comolli 2015, 84105).
Boko Haram Funding
In the beginnings of Boko Haram, most funding came from agriculture, small trading
activities as well as local small businesses set up with microloans by Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 78).
Further, funding comes from members who are expected to pay a membership fee of 100 Naira
(0.8$) per year, from donations including from politicians as well as ties to other terrorist
organizations and money from robberies, ransom money, and protection money. Boko Haram is
also involved with Al-Qaeda, which helps fund Boko Haram and provides technical support
(Comolli 2015, 80). Many Boko Haram members are also part of the local government and
collect taxes for Boko Haram. However, this has stopped with the 2013 state of emergency
(Comolli 2015, 80-82).
A military response to Boko Haram by the Nigerian government
Nigeria has started to deploy the military with the help of the police as early as 2003 and
has since been in frequent contact with Boko Haram. Nigeria has the best equipped and bestfunded military in West Africa with 80,000 troops, and the emergence of Boko Haram increased
the Nigerian defense budget (Comolli 2015, 109-110). Further struggles in the North of Nigeria,
especially Borno led to the emergence of the JTF ORO, Joint Task Force Operation Restore
Order in 2011. The task force’s activity led to Boko Haram’s relocation to Yobe state. As a
result, the government deployed the JTF ORO also to Yobe, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and
Adamawa. However, the JTF ORO had several problems, including difficulty to obtain
intelligence due to the refusal of locals to cooperate and the extensive borders (Comolli 2015,
110-115).

33
Then in 2011, the first state of emergency was declared. This affected Borno, Yobe,
Niger and Plateau states. More importantly, though, this also granted emergency powers
including the ability to detain a suspect, taking control of any property in the emergency area as
well as entry and search of any promises to the Nigerian military (Comolli 2015, 115-117). In
response, Boko Haram gave Christians in the North a three days’ notice to leave the area and
announced that Boko Haram would be ready to fight the government. Boko Haram then
launched attacks in several states, against Christians and Muslims almost daily and President
Goodluck Jonathan received much criticism as a result from both Muslims and Christians alike.
In 2012 the state of emergency was lifted; however, Boko Haram’s violence did not stop. Boko
Haram continued to cause violence by destroying several dozen cell towers, killing foreign
workers including health workers.
As a response, in November 2012 the government put an N50 million bounty on Shekau
and lesser sums on individuals believed to be with Shekau (Comolli 2015, 120). Negotiations
between the government and Boko Haram then started with the government offering amnesty for
fighters willing to renounce violence. Meanwhile Boko Haram was negotiating for the freedom
of all detained members. Further attempts to negotiate with Boko Haram led to the murder of the
point in contact, Babakura Fuggu, the brother in law of Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 123). In 2013
another state of emergency was declared, and the largest military deployment since the Nigerian
Civil War was recorded. Additional curfews, entry and search and detention powers were
granted to the military. This removal of constitutional rights arguably made matters worse,
decreasing trust in the government, military, and police (Comolli 2015, 125). The JTF was then
again deployed into the North of Nigeria, setting up a communication blackout and rounding up
Boko Haram members as well as innocents, many were killed.
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Nevertheless, Boko Haram continued to attack, now especially schools. However, locals
were said to fear the JTF more than Boko Haram. Fed up with this many young men started
“Civilian JTFs,” to identify and point out real Boko Haram members to the JTF (Comolli 2015,
125-127). Boko Haram responded to this by declaring war on the civilian JTFs and killing many.
In late 2013, the the Army 7th Infantry Division replaced the JTF. This was partly due to
the JTF being controversial and only somewhat successful. This was also because Boko Haram
evolved as an organization, using women and children as spies and smuggling explosives and
IED’s. The state of emergency was then extended until 2014 (Comolli 2015, 128). In 2014, the
most known associated event with Boko Haram happened. Boko Haram kidnapped school girls
in Chibok, Borno. This happened for several reasons, including financial gain through human
trafficking, to upstage the Nigerian government's authority, to provide brides for fights and as
Comolli argues for bargaining power and as retaliation to the JTF arresting and detaining many
children and wives of Boko Haram members. In response, the Nigerian government released
some of these wives, including one of Shekau’s wives. This also prompted a massive
international response with military support from the UK, USA, Canada, France, China and
Israel (Comolli 2015, 130).
Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria
Human rights abuses in Nigeria have especially increased with the military response to
Boko Haram. The Nigerian military engaged in many extrajudicial killings during raids in
Nigeria, primarily due to a lack of trust in the rule of law (Comolli 2015, 131). Military raids
with the goal to hunt down Boko Haram have also destroyed buildings, homes and killed
innocent civilians. The JTF ORO has been especially controversial as they often engaged in
harassment and rape during raids as well as taking bribes during vehicle checks (Comolli 2015,

35
135). Amnesty International has reported that over 950 people have died in military custody in
2013 (Comolli 2015, 136).
A non-military approach
While the Nigerian government has heavily responded to Boko Haram with the military,
some softer approaches have been taken as well. Some non-military approaches have included
community programs and strengthening the rule of law. The Nigerian National Security Advisor
office has plans to counter the radicalization of the youth in Nigeria through community
programs and to work with the local government as well as NGOs. In order to flush out
extremism in church and education, a register of “good” imams and radical one has been created
(Comolli 2015, 136). The Nigerian NSA established a program and goals focused on education
and preventing radicalization before it emerges but also in prison, as well as alleviating poverty
all with the help of NGO’s, the UN, and civil organizations. These projects were implemented in
2013 and 2014, with plans such as creating new curriculums for schools. However, this often
faces challenges such as the lack of schools, to begin with and targeting the wrong group of teens
(Comolli 2015, 135-141). These challenges are associated with a lack of funds as well as
implementation.
(Forced) Recruitment of RUF fighters
Recruitment of RUF fighters involved the RUF breaking into homes, tying up parents and
shooting them in front of their sons. The sons are then captured and forced into fighting for the
RUF. Ex-RUF fighters testified at a trial against Sankoh that they were forced and coerced into
fighting for the RUF using violence and fear. Eventually, many of the RUF fighters developed
familial ties to Sankoh, most likely due to losing their own families at the hands of the RUF as
well as their young age (Gberie 2005, 62-63). Girls and boys of captured towns were also forced
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to help and fight for the RUF. However, others joined the RUF willingly, fed up with the Momoh
regime.
After the war
After the war the British forces withdrew most of their troops, leaving behind a military
training team. UNAMISL also dismantled most of their troops, completely withdrawing from
Sierra Leone in 2005 ((Gberie 2005, 105). The successor of UNAMISL was the United Nations
Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOISL). The Sierra Leonean civil war left behind mass
atrocities. Over 50,000 people died as a result of the war (Gberie 2005, 6). After the war, Kabbah
was re-elected President for another five-year term. The political party of the RUF, RUFP, had
little support and did not have a single seat in parliament (Carter Center 2003). The atrocities
committed at the hands of the RUF during the war was long and grave. The RUF was responsible
for several massacres of civilians, the drafting of underage soldiers, mass rapes and mutilations
were committed (Gberie 2005, 125; Oosterveld 2013, 235). The forcible recruitment of children
in the war led to many children brainwashed and drugged resulting in withdrawal symptoms and
left with no families.
Additionally, over two million people were displaced, and villages were destroyed
(Kuiter 2001). In 2003, the Special Court of Sierra Leone issued indictments of war crimes to
several key figures in the civil war including Sankoh, Hinga Norman, and Charles Taylor.
Sankoh then died in prison in July 2003 (Farah 2003).
Sierra Leone today
While human security has improved in Sierra Leone, the state is still weak with damaged
institutions and a general distrust of politics (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Civil society and
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communities are also weakened, with high unemployment and former child soldiers needing a
new place in society (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). The collapse of the legal system, corruption,
poor service delivery of essential goods like water and lack of transparency are all characterisitcs
of the weak state of Sierra Leone. The general state of the infrastructure is poor, and the Sierra
Leonean military has been decreased to 13,000 troops (Robertshawe 2010). High levels of
poverty and deprivation, as well as a weak judiciary, also contribute to high levels of crime.
Another factor of human rights violations is female genital mutilation, which has grown to be a
prominent practice in Sierra Leone (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Little funds for public resources
such as education has also weakened civil society Especially women have been marginalized in
Sierra Leone both during and after the war. Another marginalized group in Sierra Leone are the
youth, including former child soldiers. Many emerged from the war without any job prospects
with 58% of young people being unemployed. Poor schooling and forced displacement into cities
contributed to this. However, life is not much better in rural areas, where domestic violence is
high, and around 80%-90% of girls undergo female genital mutilation (FGM). Young men are
often forced into modern-day slavery as they are required to work, for several years, for the
family of a girl they may want to marry (Kaldor and Vincent 2006).
Moreover, the economy has suffered throughout and after the war. Sierra Leone’s GDP
decreased by more than half during the war, partly due to the immense destruction of
infrastructures such as markets, stores, rice fields, and mining fields. While economic growth has
increased after the war, the country is highly indebted and dependent on foreign aid. Sierra
Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world with 82% of the population living on less than
$2 a day.
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Quantitative Analysis
Nigeria
This section explores the data showing the distribution of violent events and aid in Nigeria.
Descriptive Statistics

Projects
Transactions
Events (GED)
Events
(ACLED)
Valid N
(listwise)

N
Minimum
Statistic Statistic
292
1.00
289
431.00
271
1.00
542
.00

Maximum
Statistic
46.00
903 million
288.00
239.00

Mean
Std. Deviation
Statistic
Std. Error
Statistic
4.83
.35
6.04
611 million
77 million
1 billion
7.89
1.43
23.61
8.40
.80
18.74
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for violent events and aid for Nigeria, sources: GED, ACLED, AidData

Table 3 shows that the average of GED and ACLED events are around 8. This comes
with a standard deviation of 23 and 18 events, showing how many events, on average, are higher
or lower than the average amount of events. The mean for aid tells us the average amount of aid,
being 611million U.S dollars. The mean for projects tells us that the average amount of projects
is 4.8.
Violent Events
In Figure 1: Violent events per year in Nigeria, source: GED database it becomes clear that violent
events as recorded by the GED database increased around 2010 and continuously increased up to
2015. This indicates the emergence of Boko Haram around 2008/2009 (Felter 2018).

Variance
Statistic
36.51
1.7 trillion
557.67
351.43
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Furthermore, the difference in a number of events pre and post-2010 is stark. This is
interesting considering that Boko Haram was active before. However, the numbers reflect
important events as well as a change in leadership well. While Boko Haram emerged at the
University of Maiduguri in 1995, the sect did not become fully radicalized until Mohammed
Yusuf took over in 2002 (Comolli 2015, 47). From late 2004 to 2008 Boko Haram stayed mostly
dormant re-emerging after a violent clash with the security forces, JTF ORO (Comolli 2015, 5152). After the capture and extra-judicial kill of Yusuf in 2009, a new leader emerged in 2010.
Abubakar Shekau, the second in command to Yusuf took over. Shekau is known to be even more
radical than Yusuf and altered the movement to be even more violent. This coincides with the
enormous surge of violent events in 2010. With the new leadership also came new splinter
groups to Boko Haram as well as recruits from neighboring countries, increasing the violence.
The increase in violence, especially around 2009 and 2010 and the continuous increase can be
explained by the change of leadership in Boko Haram, making the organization more radical.

Figure 1: Violent events per year in Nigeria, source:
GED database

Figure 2: Violent events per state in Nigeria in from 19902014 using satellite view, source: GED
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Figure 2 further shows the number of violent events in Nigeria per state in total. This
includes all violent events in Nigeria from 1990 to 2014. The graphs show clusters of many
events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. These states are Borno in the very
north, Yobe state to the left of Borno, Adamawa state underneath Borno and Plateau state. Borno
is perhaps the most important state when studying Boko Haram. Boko Haram emerged out of
Maiduguri, a city in Borno. They then recruited young men from the local university as well as
almajirai. Almajirai is boys that have received a formal Islamic education. Due to this education
and the lack of professional education, many almajirai fail to find employment (Comolli 2015,
70-72). Yusuf promised financial stability and a purpose in life. Yobe state then became the
second base of operations when military and the JTF ORO flooded Borno with officials starting
in 2009. Why events in Adamawa are high is not particularly clear but may be due to its
proximity to Borno state as well as the border to Chad and Cameroon. This border later became
significant as more and more fighters were recruited from neighboring countries and splinter
groups formed of Boko Haram, involved in conflicts such as the civil war in Mali (Comolli 2015,
115-130). Violent events are particularly high in states such as Borno, as Boko Haram originated
out of this state and as it sees a significant number of grievances.
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Figure 3: Violent events and year in Nigeria, Source:
ACLED

Figure 4: ACLED events per state in Nigeria in total with
satellite view, source: ACLED

Additionally, Error! Reference source not found. shows that data from the GED dataset
also coincides with information according to the ACLED database. However, the data seems to
show more events than graph 1. This can be due to the methodology used in the ACLED dataset
and GED dataset. This methodology can mean that the ACLED database classifies more events
as political violence.

Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found. show
that violent events are also high in other states, other than Borno. Here, events are still high in
Borno state and Bauchi, however also in states located in the Niger Delta such as Delta, Edo, and
Bayelsa. These events in the Niger Delta can most likely be attributed to the large oil reserves in
the area. These oil reserves have been subject to many conflicts including civil unrest. Starting
2003 militants started to form in the Niger Delta, attempting to fight the exploitation of
multinational corporations such as Shell (Pigrau 2013). The data suggest that most events are
caused by two groups, Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants.
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Transactions
In this graph (Error! Reference source not found.), it is evident that transactions
increased explicitly
around 2009 when
Boko Haram’s activity
increased and became
more violent. It is
interesting to note that
this was also the year
the Nigerian
government began
heavily cracking down
on Boko Haram,

Figure 5: Aid transactions and year in Nigeria, Source: AidData

detaining many of its members as well as detaining and killing Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 109).
However, after 2010 transactions plummeted, while Boko Haram gained even more traction
throughout the years with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014 (Holpuch
2018). It is unclear why transactions plummeted, but maybe due to reasons such as aid dedicated
to entirely different areas in the first place or a changing objective of donor countries. For
instance, many aid organizations such as the Gates foundation provide aid for global health
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problems such as AIDS. AIDS in Nigeria has decreased by 21%. Therefore, programs targeting
AIDS prevention would likely decrease the amount of aid given (UNAIDS n.d)
Figure 6 shows the breakdown of transactions per state in Nigeria. It becomes clear that
aid is concentrated at the other side of the country, primarily in states such as Sokoto on the
border to Niger, and the cluster of Katsina, Kano, and Kaduna. While Borno state receives
considerable amounts of aid, surrounding states such as Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe and Adamawa
receive little in comparison. This is shocking as Boko Haram activity concentrates in all of these
states with bases in Yobe. However, many nations also give aid for different objectives other
than fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria, concentrating on different areas. For example, Briggs
(2017) found that aid does not flow to the poorest regions in a country (Briggs 2017, 187). The
concentrated aid in the North West of Nigeria could be due to poverty levels there (McAdams
2014). Sokoto state has been ranked as the poorest state in Nigeria with a poverty rate of 89.9%
(Egbas 2018). Poverty levels in the North East are high as well. States such as Jigawa and Yobe
have high poverty levels as well, however, receive less aid. States such as Kano, on the other
hand, have also been a victim to considerable high-profile attacks by Boko Haram. This includes
explosions killing over 200 people (Comolli 2015, 133). Aid is concentrated in states where
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Boko Haram does not necessarily operate which may be due to other objectives of donor
countries.

Figure 6: Transactions per state in Nigeria in total, source: AidData

Figure 7: Projects and year, Source: AidData

Figure 8: Projects per state in Nigeria in total with satellite
view, Source: AidData
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Figure 7 and Error! Reference source not found. show that many areas of Nigeria
receive help through projects. Projects are categorized as development projects financed through
foreign aid; these projects are aimed at improving certain area or institutions of the country.
Notably, Borno has a high number of projects as do Cross River, Kaduna, Kano, and Niger.
Projects in Borno are consistent with an argument that aid targets conflict-heavy areas. Cross
River on the other hand is a popular tourist destination as it includes many waterfalls, national
parks and festivals (Cross River State Government 2019). Kaduna and Kono on the other hand
house many corporations such as textile manufacturers (Maiwada and Renne 2013).
Further, Niger is a state in the Niger Delta, the most important oil-producing region in
Africa, where militant groups have formed in protest of the oil industry (Pigrau 2013). Projects
have fluctuated throughout time with most projects beginning in 2010. From then on projects
decreased which could be due to safety concerns. Several aid workers have been targeted and
killed by Boko Haram and countries such as the United States de-branding the name USAID
from their programs in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 148).
Summary
The quantitative analysis on Nigeria shows that events have increased particularly
starting in 2009 corresponding
with the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009. Transactions and projects also increased around
2009, consistent with this emergence and spur of violence in 2009. However, aid projects and
transactions decreased throughout the years, while violent events and the presence of Boko
Haram in Nigeria has increased. This is somewhat inconsistent with the hypotheses that aid
decreased violence. However, this observation also highlights two problems in this study. For
one, this research does not encompass reasons why countries give aid and for what specific area.
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The aid given may have been given to target a completely different area of the country, having
no effect on violence. Secondly, it is also difficult to conclude whether or not aid reduces
violence or if violence simply sparks more countries to give aid. This shows that aid may not be
able to decrease violence by itself or that aid is motivated by something other than violence.
Sierra Leone
This section explores the data showing the distribution of violent events and aid in Sierra Leone.
Descriptive Statistics

Projects
Transactions
Events (GED)
Events
(ACLED)

N
Minimum
Statistic Statistic
59
1.00
58 4 million
35
57

1.00
.00

Maximum
Statistic
86.00
2 billion

Mean
Statistic
30.94
463 million

186.00
370.00

41.45
37.84

Std. Deviation
Std. Error
Statistic
2.85
21.90
61 million
467 million
6.64
10.56

39.32
79.78

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Sierra Leone, Source: ACLED, GED, AidData

Table 4 shows 35 observations of violent events (state-year) in the GED dataset and 57
observations in the ACLED database. The minimum amount of events recorded in the GED is 1
with a maximum of 186. Meanwhile, the ACLED has a minimum amount of 0 with a maximum
of 370 events. The mean tells us that on average around 40 events were recorded per year. With
41 in the GED dataset and 37 in the ACLED dataset.

Variance
Statistic
479.63
218
quadrillion
1546.72
6365.17
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Violent Events

Figure 9: Events and year in Sierra Leone, Source:
GED

Figure 10: Events and year, Source: ACLED

Figure 9 and Figure 11 show the increase of violent events starting in 1990 with a spike
in 1998, ending around 2000. There is a specific spike of events in 1998 and decrease of events
in 1996, 1999 2000 and 2001. The spike of events in 1998 coincides with the intervention of
ECOMOG and President Kabbah taking back the presidency after the previous coup, removing
him from power (Gberie 2005, 111). The intervention of the ECOMOG forces sparked much
violence at. First, however ECOMOG was able to take over major cities and areas. In 1999
events decreased drastically, most likely due to the Lomé peace deal. The Lomé peace deal was
able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, allowing DDR
programs to take into effect. This disarmed many rebels and allowed them to receive food,
shelter, and training in return (Gberie 2005, 163). From then on violent events decreased through
2002, when the civil war officially ended.

Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that violent events have increased throughout 1998 and then
decreased after the Lomé peace deal was signed in 1999.
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Figure 11: Violent events and province in Sierra
Leone, Source: GED

Figure 12: Events and province in Sierra Leone,
Source: ACLED

Transactions/Aid

Figure 13: Transactions and year, Source: AidData

Figure 14: Transactions and province in Sierra
Leone, Source: AidData

Figure 13, Figure 14, Error! Reference source not found. and Figure 16 show that aid was
given as a form of post-conflict reconciliation to rebuild the country. Figure 11 shows that aid
increased after the civil war was over. Around 2003 just right after the civil war ended aid
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increased in Sierra Leone with a spike in 2003 and 2010, suggesting aid given as a form of postconflict reconciliation. Similarly, Figure 11 shows that projects increased as well especially after
the end of the civil war and an additional spike from 2007 to 2012.
Summary
This quantitative analysis on Sierra Leone shows that violence in Sierra Leone increased

Figure 15: Projects and year: AidData

Figure 16: Projects and Province in Sierra Leone,
Source: AidData

during the civil war, especially coinciding with the intervention of ECOMOG forces and
fluctuating presidencies and coups. Violence decreased dramatically after the signing of the
Lomé peace deal and then further after the end of the war in 2002. After 2002 and with the end
of the war came an increase in aid projects and transactions, presumably to reintegrate former
soldiers and rebuild the nation. This is consistent with the hypotheses, stating that aid has an
impact on post-conflict reconciliation. This is further instrumental in rebuilding the country and
reintegrating former soldiers.
Summary of Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis’s primary focus was to test the relationship of foreign aid on
political violence in a quantitative matter. The quantitative analysis studied the cases of Sierra
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Leone and Nigeria. The analysis focused on Sierra Leone, and Nigeria shows how violent events,
transactions, and projects coincide. In the case of Sierra Leone, there is an increase in violent
events at the same time as the intervention of ECOMOG forces in the civil war and President
Kabbah taking back the presidency after the previous coup (Gberie 2005, 111). Then 1999,
around the time of the Lomé peace deal, events decreased drastically. The Lomé peace deal was
able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, allowing DDR
programs to take into effect. After the Lomé peace deal was signed into effect, violent events
decreased through 2002, when the civil war officially ended. After the 2002 mark, transactions
and projects increased showing that aid was given as a form of post-conflict reconciliation to
rebuild the country. The increase of aid after the war and violent events after military
interventions match with expectations for this project. This also shows that it is worthwhile
studying post-conflict reconciliation as countries give more aid after the conflict is over.
For the study of Nigeria, the emergence of violent events coincides with the emergence
of Boko Haram and its violent spurs throughout the years. The analysis also shows clusters of
many events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. This also matches with the
emergence of Boko Haram in the North, specifically Borno. Transactions increased explicitly
around 2009 when Boko Haram’s activity increased and became more violent. However,
transactions then fluctuated throughout the years, although Boko Haram increased their violent
events with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014. This is interesting to see
as the expected outcome would be seeing aid increase as events increase. This also highlights the
difficulty of the project and assessing aid. This project does not address why countries give aid,
as this is not in the scope of this thesis and would require more research. For instance, the aid
given to Nigeria could have been given for reasons other than reducing terrorism. It is also
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important to note that both cases benefit from foreign aid as it funnels more resources into the
nation, allowing the combatting of grievances.
Qualitative Analysis
A humanitarian approach to Boko Haram by aid organizations
While the Nigerian government primarily focused on deploying their Nigerian military
within states to combat Boko Haram, foreign aid and development programs focused on a more
humanitarian approach. As both poverty and education contribute heavily to the circumstances
surrounding the recruitment of Boko Haram, this section focuses on aid projects focused on
improving education and decreasing poverty. The section then evaluates how much these
projects were able to address these grievances commonly associated with political violence.
Education in Nigeria
Education in Nigeria begins with basic education which parents expect to be free and
starts at six years old. Basic education then consists of six years of primary education and three
years of junior education teaching children literacy, math, the three main languages of Nigeria
and English. The junior education level then increases the number of courses taken to ten to
thirteen and regularly tests the students on their knowledge. Successful completion of their
exams rewards them with a certificate to go on to the senior schooling levels. The senior
education level is designed to prepare the students for university. After successful completion of
three years of senior education and passing the senior level exams, a student may choose to go
onto university (International Organization for Migration 2014).
While enrollment in schools in Nigeria rose through the 1970s, the 1990s and post-1990s
saw a decline in enrollment. Today around 61% of Nigerian students receive primary education.
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However, this number changes according to regional disparities with numbers much lower in the
North of Nigeria. In 2010, Northern Nigeria experienced the lowest enrollment rate of 19% while
Southern Nigeria’s highest education rate was 91% (International Organization for Migration
2014). The presence of militants and political violence also influences education, especially in
the North, with many schools being forced to close (World Bank 2015). Female education
enrollment is also much lower compared to male education enrollment in the North, while
female education enrollment in the South is higher than male education enrollment in the South.
Education enrollment sees an even more drastic change when it comes to junior, senior and
college enrollment. The gross enrollment ratio (GER) for secondary education is estimated to be
around 31% with 7.2 million young people not enrolled in school. This ratio falls even more with
the transition from junior to senior levels, with a transition rate of 16% (International
Organization for Migration 2014). For those that do attend schools learning outcomes are poor.
Many students enrolled and graduating from primary school are unable to read which is due to
poor skillset of teachers and the lack of resources (World Bank 2015)
Once a student completes the senior education level with plans to attend university, they
may face additional capacity challenges. Currently, Nigeria has 153 universities with only
around half a million slots open for students each year. In 2013, 1.7 million candidates registered
for the university entrance exams, even though slots were limited. While the number of
universities keeps increasing, the capacity and quality does not (International Organization for
Migration 2014)
A needs assessment of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and funded by
the European Union shows gaps in the Nigerian education system. These gaps start with skill
level gaps between Nigerian students and global standards, in science, math, foreign languages
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and technology in the basic and post-basic education system. But it also shows that often
teachers lack pedagogical, technology and counseling skills. Lack of infrastructure, teaching
materials, and research equipment is a crucial factor and a factor in the mass exodus out of
Nigeria in search of better education (International Organization for Migration 2014). This mass
exodus of people in search of a better education also hurts the Nigerian economy as skilled labor
and the educated leave the job market, leaving behind unskilled labor or those with limited
education.
Hypothetical Claim
To make an impact on terrorism and recruitment and for H1 to hold to be true, we should
see that aid projects such as the project on Global Partnership for Education have improved
factors such as net school enrollment, literacy rates as well as gender gaps in education.
Aid Project in Nigeria on Education
A significant global program to improve education all around the world is the Global
Partnership for Education. The Global Partnership for Education is a program that includes
several countries aimed to improve education in developing countries working with grants
through civil society organizations and coordinating agencies, often the World Bank. Nigeria is a
part of the Global Partnership for Education and the last grant the Nigerian government has
received is aimed at “promoting school effectiveness and improved learning outcomes”,
“increasing access to basic education for out of school girls” and strengthening planning and
management systems including learning assessments and capacity development” and has a
budget of 100million US dollars (World Bank 2015). The project focuses particularly on
Northern states, which also have the highest numbers of out of school children. This is due to
many children attending religious schools or poverty. Others begin education much later than at
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six years old or drop out of school after receiving their primary education, around age eleven
(World Bank 2015).
The grant by the NIPEP supports the Nigerian government in improving human capital in a
bid to strengthen its economy. The grant identified five Northern states with especially poor
education; those states are Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto (World Bank 2015). The
goal of improving education is measured with the following indicators:
•

Primary Net Enrollment Rate

•

Gender Parity Index (primary enrollment)

•

Hausa reading rate of students enrolled in the Primary 2 and three grades

•

English reading rate of Primary 3 pupils

•

Number of Direct Project beneficiaries (disaggregated by gender)

•

Establishment of a System for Learning Assessment at the primary level

•

The utility of the Learning Assessment System

The project stresses the importance of working together with the Nigerian government as well as
the states and to set realistic goals for the project. The project has three components with the
following goals:
Goal
Promoting School Effectiveness and
Improved Learning Outcomes

Indicators/ Specific Action
Grants for students and material, established
classrooms, support for the cost of training of
teachers, improving enrollment and
encouraging students to stay in school
Increasing Access to Basic Education for Out- Expand basic education to girls through
Of-School Girls
scholarships for students and female teachers,
supporting staff, teachers, and facilities
crucial in helping girls learn
Strengthening Planning and Management
Improving management, monitoring and
Systems including Learning Assessment and
capacity building through audits, reviews and
Capacity Development
progress reports as well as school visits

55
Table 5: Grant Goals for Education Project in Nigeria, Source: World Bank 2015

However, the project also has an estimated risk factor of high due to a relatively short
time horizon to implement the policies, the decentralized flow of funds and coordination
difficulties across five states and security risks (World Bank 2015). The report also points to
corruption as a possible challenge in the project, which the grant aims to curb through improving
education management on the local level. The project and funds are also regularly audited to
prevent corruption and to increase accountability.
Project Success
Direct Success
Several factors including percentage enrollment, gender parity index, Hausa and English
reading rates for primary students every year measure the success of the project While the
percentage of students enrolled in school decreases during the time the project has been running,
the gender parity index increases and the reading levels in English and Hausa stay the same, as
seen in table 2 (World Bank 2018).

Primary school
net enrollment
Gender parity
index
Hausa reading
rates
English reading
rates

Baseline (2015)
48 %

Actual (2017)
46.40%

Current (2018)
46.40%

Goal (for 2019)
52%

72%

83%

83%

76%

4%

4%

4%

10%

3%

3%

3%

10%

Table 6: Goal assessment of education project in Nigeria, source: World Bank 2018

Aid project impact on terrorism
While this project is a good start in making education more attainable and increasing the
number of students enrolled in school, it misses the important part of non-integrated Qur’anic
schools. As Menashy finds in her study, GPE projects often fail to address the issue of private
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schooling such as Qur’anic schools (Menashy 2017, 250). Many students that are not enrolled in
regular education are enrolled in Qur’anic schools, and most members of Boko Haram are
comprised of graduates of Qur’anic schools. Integrating Qur’anic schools is essential to
improving the education level in Nigeria as many Qur’anic schools do not teach math, science or
languages. Some programs to look for in this matter is a project by UNICEF in Nigeria.
UNICEF projects implemented in Nigeria focus on the integration of Qur’anic schools
with the regular education system and improving the education system overall. UNICEF in
Nigeria focuses particularly on girls’ education as well as capacity building and focusing on
children not enrolled in school. The program aims to work with the Nigerian government as well
as unilateral aid-organizations such as USAID. UNICEF particularly plans to increase teacher
competencies and gender inclusive pedagogy, which will be done through capacity building for
primary teachers and qur’anic facilities (UN ECOSOC 2017). The program also supports
strengthening the community and their understanding of education as well as increasing
enrollment through enrollment drives. UNICEF in Nigeria has also been able to inspire local
imams and Qur’anic leaders to integrate their schools with the Nigerian education system
(Akingbulu 2018).
Possible Shortcomings
The project failed the expectations set to satisfy H1. H1 states that countries that receive
more aid see less political violence when aid generates economic growth, political rights and a
strengthened rule of law. However, this does not necessarily mean that the project has done no
good. In table 2 it becomes evident that the project has increased the percentage of schools
benefiting from grants and further training. This project is one of many, and it may take several
projects over time to sufficiently improve the factors set as determining factors in the
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hypothetical claim section. The project report also fails to incorporate a critical view of the
project fully and does not address limitations. However, a large part of this may be because the
project is still going on and is not scheduled to be finished until 2019.
A better idea of the success of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) may be gained
through scholarly reports on the program. Menashy (2017) studies the overall success of the
Global Partnership for Education project with special attention to private schooling. Overall,
GPE projects fail to address private schooling in receiving countries (Menashy 2017, 240).
Menashy argues that this is mostly due to the multistakeholder nature of the GPE, representing
many political bodies that choose to “strategically avoid” the topic of private education. This is
largely due to the possibility of institutional clashing, causing political entities in
multistakeholder organizations to avoid the subject. This further applies to other policies that
may cause clashing or disagreement, with private education highlighting the issue (Menashy
2017, 261). This is an important factor to keep in mind which may render the projects by the
GPE less successful, in terms of achieving their goals.
Summary
The project was mostly unsuccessful in achieving its pre-set goals such as improving
access to education. This, however, does not mean that aid is necessarily unsuccessful in
addressing grievances but highly conditional on understanding and addressing local conditions.
Understanding and addressing these local conditions is important for the success of the project
but also to cut down recruitment for a terror organization. For instance, the project did not focus
enough on Qur’anic schools, a breeding ground for Boko Haram recruits. Additionally, this
project faces criticism of the general structure of GPE projects due to its multistakeholder nature.
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Poverty in Nigeria
As evident in the section on education, poverty is growing in Nigeria and impacting other
sectors such as education. During the 1990s economic growth stagnated, however, this improved
through the 200s with an increase of 5% in GDP (World Bank 2014). The economy in Nigeria is,
however, still not growing enough to support the large population. Poverty was especially bad
after the Nigerian military rule ended, characterized as a rural phenomenon with rates of up to
70% in some rural areas. While the poverty rate decreased for a short period in 2004, the total
population living in poverty did not decreased due to population growth. The poverty rate then
increased again in 2010 to rates of 70% (World Bank 2014). This poverty rate has devastating
consequences for another sector of life, decreasing the number of children being able to go to
school, decreasing the amount of the population with safe access to water and increasing child
mortality rates.
The poverty rates in Nigeria are high, although there are a general increase and
improvement of the Nigerian economy. Today, the Nigerian economy is considered the largest
economy in Africa is mostly benefiting from the petroleum industry (Ajayi 2019). The Nigerian
economy benefited from an increase in oil prices in the 1970s, massively increasing the
economy. This also improved infrastructure, government services, construction and
manufacturing jobs which led to many people moving to more urban areas. The sudden
migration from rural to more urban centers, reduced the agricultural sector massively causing the
need to import primary commodities (Ajayi 2019). Beginning with the 21st century, Nigeria
continued to face unsteady growth which led the government to lend from international sources
and introducing austerity measures. To repay their massive debt, much of the national budget
was designated to repay loans. A 2005 debt-relief plan by the Paris Club forgave Nigeria most of
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its debt. However, the high fluctuation of oil prices led Nigeria to a recession in 2016, from
which the country is still recovering from today (Adebayo 2018).
Poverty is still a devastating factor in the lives of many Nigerians today. As of 2018,
Nigeria has the largest number of people living in poverty followed by India. Eighty-seven
million Nigerians live in poverty today, on average living on less than $2 a day (Adebayo 2018).
This number is further increasing with an average of six people falling into extreme poverty
every minute. While Nigeria has launched programs such as the structural adjustment program
pre-1999, this also failed in improving poverty (World Bank 2014). A recent report by Oxfam
and Development Finance International ranked the commitment to reducing poverty from the
Nigerian government at the bottom of 157 countries (Kazeem 2018).
Hypothetical Claim
To make an impact on terrorism and recruitment and for H1 to hold to be true, the World
Bank project on alleviating poverty should see an increase in access to basic infrastructure in
select states.
Aid Project in Nigeria on Poverty
The fail in the structural adjustment program in the 1990s led the government to rethink their
approach to poverty in Nigeria, which fostered a partnership with the World Bank. The World
Bank along with the Nigerian government and the African Development Bank then developed
the CPRP project with the following project objectives:
•

To improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure

•

To increase the availability and management of development resources at the community
level
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The project focuses on the states with the highest poverty levels, as selected by the Nigerian
government; Abia, Cross River, Ekiti, Kebbi, Kogi and Yobe (World Bank 2014). In another
phase of the program the states Edo, Gombe, Osun, Zamfara, Ebonyi and Kwara were added.
The project marked the first large poverty reduction project targeted at fostering communitybased projects. The project was also the first poverty reduction project partly carried out by the
government, focusing on the community aspect at all. The project cost around 103million U.S
dollars with the following goals:
Goal
Capacity building

Community-based initiatives in basic social
and economic infrastructure

Indicators/Specific Action
Support institutions in poverty monitoring,
monitor impact of state-led programs, provide
resources
Independent state-level social fund to fund
community initiatives, education and
information on the local level, supervising
and funding micro-projects

Table 7: Project Goals, Source: World Bank 2014

The project has a complex framework with several parties involved, including ministries
at the federal level, the respective state governments, and community level governments and
committees. The framework of the project can is summarized in Figure 17.
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Figure 17: World Bank Project on Poverty Reduction in Nigeria framework, source: World Bank 2014

The project was largely carried out by the Nigerian National Planning Commission
(NPC), which is the Nigerian agency responsible for poverty reduction. However, this was
switched to the Federal Ministry of Finance as the NPC lacked the capacity for the project.
Project Success
Direct Success
The success of the project is evaluated by measuring the outcomes of the two objectives,
improving access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure and increasing the availability
and management of development resources at the community level. Access of the poor to social
and economic infrastructure has been improved, with 2999 micro projects. These micro-projects
were mostly focused on education, water supply, health, roads and bridges (World Bank 2014).
The projects were also sustainable, with 92% of projects still being operated after one year and
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around 90% of projects after four years. Figure 2 shows the number of projects per state and
sector.

Figure 18: Amount of projects per state and sector, source: World Bank 2014

3085 communities benefited from the project, accounting for 10.3 million residents. In addition,
school enrollment in primary states grew by around 60% in states where the project was being
carried out. The second outcome measured, increasing the availability and management of
development resources at the community level is rated modest with over 300 communities
participated in micro-projects. Over 300 organizations also received skill-based training in
managing funds. While agencies and arrangements were put in place, cooperation between the
government and community does not appear strengthened.
Aid project impact on political violence and recruitment
The project did meet the goals set to satisfy H1. The project was able to improve basic
infrastructure to reduce poverty. Reducing poverty and creating social stability is instrumental in
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stabilizing the country and groups that are at risk of being recruited. Poverty is a factor that can
constitute relative deprivation and therefore increase frustration among the population. A United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report shows that stark levels of unemployment, as
well as economic need, often play a significant role in the recruitment of members in terror cells.
While economic factors are not the tipping point for recruits, it certainly aids terrorist
organizations in recruiting (UNDP 2017, 55).
Poverty is a big factor in recruiting within terror cells due to psychological and economic
factors. A psychological factor is the decreasing positive outlook on life and opportunity. Lack of
opportunity is also the main economic reason, having no job and little money to provide for
public services. The lack of opportunity becomes an easy target for terror cells that can provide a
sense of belonging, public services and status. For instance, Boko Haram was able to provide
monetary incentives to their members and splinter groups of Boko Haram are currently providing
public services. Especially the provision of public services by the splinter group ISWAP garners
much support, as these services are provided to non-Members as well (Obaji 2019). The project
is still important, however, as it increases institutional access to education and the provision of
public services. Therefore, the program is a good start in reducing the recruitment of members.
However the state needs to be strengthened as well to increase public resources.
Possible Shortcomings
The project has improved access to basic infrastructure immensely as seen in figure 2.
However, the success of the project may be limited as the results framework had not been fully
developed at the time of the project. Several components of the projects, especially funding
community projects had no designated organization to provide these resources. Another limiting
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factor in community projects was the lack of trust between the Nigerian government and
individual communities (World Bank 2014).
Further, the monitoring and evaluation process of the project was not spelled out directly,
causing shortcomings. Baseline results were also not included in the project as the M & E
process was poorly spelled out, making the evaluation of goals attained much more difficult.
Several important factors that needed to be recorded for successful evaluation were not recorded
including but not limited to the involvement and attendance of community members in the
project, poverty data at the beginning of the project and number of organizations involved
(World Bank 2014).
While the World Bank addresses some of their shortcomings in their report, detailing
improvements, other factors can have an impact as well. Nigeria has suffered from extreme
poverty in the North, yet the states chosen to be a part of the project were not the ones with the
highest poverty levels. This means states with especially low poverty did not benefit from the
project. Of course, this is not much of a shortcoming as other states benefited from the program;
however targeting the correct states is crucial in reducing circumstances that influence the
recruitment of Boko Haram members.
Summary
The project was generally successful in implementing social programs and curbing
recruitment. The project was able to improve access of the poor to social and economic
infrastructure with 2999 micro projects. These micro-projects were mostly focused on education,
water supply, health, roads and bridges (World Bank 2014). However, the project ran into some
problems as it was not fully developed and frameworks to assess the success of the project was
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not fully developed before the project began to take off. In addition, while the project is a good
start to curb the recruitment of Boko Haram, more needs to be done to strengthen the
government of Nigeria.
Reconstructing Sierra Leone through aid projects
Some improvements have been made in Sierra Leone through the past years, and aid
projects still play a pivotal role. Some improvements were achieved through local councils. In
addition, a new National Election Commission Local and provisional security has been
established throughout the country, and the United Nations, as well as British troops, were
integral in helping the country post-conflict. The situation of the youth has also seen an
emergence of self-organized organizations. One example is the Bike Riders Association, a group
of former child soldiers that mostly stole motorcycles during the war. Today they earn their
money by providing transportation to people. The group has a membership base with an identity
card and maintenance support, much like a tax organization. However, none of these
organizations include girls, who have been hurt the most and have the least amount of power
(Kaldor and Vincent 2006).
As institutions and the rule of law are often damaged by political violence, post-conflict
efforts have to focus on reconstructing institutions and reintegrating the community. Sound
institutions such as the rule of law can often aid in reintegrating the community and fostering a
new trust between the community. Aid organizations and projects can help foster this new trust
and help rebuild institutions, as long as projects are tailored to the country’s needs (Mlambo
2009). In the case of Sierra Leone aid projects focused on topics such as education, the rule of
law to further overall disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). The aid projects I
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focus on in this section focuses on one DDR project focused on ex-combatants and the other on
education in Sierra Leone.
DDR in Sierra Leone
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration projects are vital to stopping a country
from slipping back into a civil war. Broken institutions, as well as the shadow state and economy
of Sierra Leone, can further foster this situation. The idea of DDR programs is to part fighters
from their weapons and militias and then help them into civilian life through education, money
and training. Since the 1908’s there have been over sixty DDR programs, many focusing on
Sierra Leone and its civil war (The Economist 2018). DDR projects started with the Lomé peace
deal. The Lomé peace deal negotiations were the first negotiations that gave civil society a voice
in peace deal negotiations, unlike in the previous three peace deal negotiations. However, the
civil society’s demand for justice was met with little enthusiasm from the government and the
RUF. Eventually, the peace deal included a ceasefire, the emergence of a DDR project and the
inclusion of the RUF in the Sierra Leonean government as well as amnesty for all fighters
(except crimes against humanity) and their reintegration into the community. The DDR process
in Sierra Leone consisted of three stages. The first stage started under the Kabbah regime in 1998
with the support of the UNDP, ECOMOG and the World Bank. This stage was designed to
provide an out for fighters, especially in already defeated regions (Sesay and Suma 2009). This
also saw the emergence of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (NCDRR) to further coordinate the reintegration of fighters.
Phase two then included RUF representatives, but otherwise still had the same mandate.
This time the NCDDR and UNAMSIL chaired more important parts of the committee. Phase
three then began after fighting continued throughout 2000, after the signing of the Lomé peace
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deal. The Abuja accords, a ceasefire agreement between the Sierra Leonean government and the
RUF, called for further disarmament of all fighters involved in the war. This stage was the final
stage as it saw no further outbursts of violence, allowing more collection centers to be set up.
The DDR process also allowed ex-fighters to be reintegrated into their community by offering
training, education and monetary incentive (Sesay and Suma 2009). However, the DDR process
left little space for women and children. The biggest challenge was that the DDR process was
only designed for ex-combatants, meaning women and children that were used as cooks, maids
or medics were left out. Women that were combatants, however, often did not receive any
incentive either as they feared further abuse in collection and training centers. The official DDR
program of Sierra Leone ended in 2003.
Hypothetical claim
If H2 holds to be true, we should see an increase in ex-combatants receiving training and
being reintegrated in the community and an increase in women participating in these programs
through the project on DDR.
Aid Project in Sierra Leone on DDR
DDR has been the focus of many multilateral and unilateral aid projects. One of these
projects is carried out by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (GIZ). The projects overall goal was to foster DDR in Sierra Leone, specifically
reintroducing ex-combatants into civilian life and establishing a peaceful community. Other
goals included poverty reduction, securing the internal peace process and creating a more
inclusive space for women. The program was employed in partnership with the NCDDR and
Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODOP), starting in 2000 until 2005 with a
total contribution of around six million Euros (Trentmann 2010). The project focused on
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vocational training as a means to reintegrate ex-combatants as well as peace building and skills
training. The project also emphasizes capacity building through the community, local and
national level. The project aimed to re-integrate ex-combatants and through this improve the
following four markers:
•

Poverty reduction through vocational training allowing ex-combatants to reduce their
chances of slipping into poverty

•

Gender equality by giving men and women the same opportunities in attaining training

•

Crisis prevention integrated into the training

•

Environmental factors such as agricultural training

The project also identified markers to evaluate the project success after initial training and the
start of the project. The markers are designed to identify the impact the project will have in the
long-term (Trentmann 2010). These markers are:
•

75% of ex-combatants remain in the settled villages

•

50% of people trained in income generating activities are still active

•

The population in targeted communities qualifies as non-violent

Project Success
Direct Success
The project had considerable success in their four individual markers and the overall goal
to reintegrate ex-combatants in the community. In particular, different social groups were able to
be reintegrated into society; this was especially successful in the local regions of Kailahun, Port
Loko, and Pujehun. However, the project covered more than just these three districts. In total, the
project focused on thirteen different states (Trentmann 2010). The project was able to
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successfully integrate several social groups into their programs and took community needs and
preferences into account. The project was also able to address goals set in poverty reduction,
gender equality, and crisis prevention. However, sustainability in terms of environmental factors
could see improvement. The project success can, therefore, be summarized in the following
table.
Project Goal
Poverty reduction

Gender Equality

Crisis prevention

Environmental factors/ sustainability

Success of Goal
The training was able to provide a better
socioeconomic status to all groups (men,
women, and children)
Women and men had equal access to training
facilities; caring centers provided an
opportunity for mothers to care for their
children
Civil and human rights, as well as crisis
management, were taught as part of the
training
Agricultural training taught the importance of
sustainability, but no measurements were
taken to improve this

Table 8: Project goals, Source: Trentmann 2010 (GIZ)

Overall the project was able to train 2354 persons [1258 noncombatants (521 women); 874 excombatants (99 women) and 222 ex-child soldiers]. Additionally, some of the long-term goals
were met by the project, as detailed below.
Long-term Goal
75% of ex-combatants remain in the settled
villages
50% of people trained in income generating
activities are still active
The population in targeted communities
qualifies as non-violent

Success of Goal
80-88% of trained ex-combatants remained in
the settled villages and are considered
integrated
60% of trained ex-combatants report their
source of income as business activities
No quantitative markers have been set or
reported for this goal, but self-reports of excombatants point towards reduced violence
due to training and general acceptance in the
community

Table 9: Outcomes of Project, Source: Trentmann 2010 (GIZ)
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Aid project impact on post-conflict reconciliation
The project meets all the goals set as markers for the hypothesis to hold true, however,
could have done more to incorporate former female soldiers and women trapped in the war. The
project was able to reintegrate many former soldiers into communities, training them and
providing them with work. This is crucial in post-conflict reconciliation as grievances, and
possible relative deprivation should be addressed to curb future political violence. This project is
a good start in terms of DDR, giving ex-combatants an opportunity to receive training and
reintegration into society.
While the project does include women in their DDR process, they do not receive special
attention or consideration in this project. Women in Sierra Leone often do not receive training
such as the one in the DDR project. Women in Sierra Leone participated in the civil war in the
forms of wives, maids, cooks or medics. However, many DDR programs require weapons to be
turned in, in return for training (Sesay and Suma 2009). As a result of that, women are often left
out of the DDR effort. Even women that did participate in the war as combatants did not receive
any training either as they feared further abuse in collection and training centers. Women in
Sierra Leone are at the periphery of society, struggling with domestic violence and suffering
from FGM. Violence against women was a horrible side effect during the civil war and did not
stop after the war was over. While some laws are designed to give women an out in abusive
relationships, most of these laws are never enforced. Other laws allow men to have immense
control over women, especially in a marriage. For instance, a widow can be forced to marry her
deceased husbands’ brother or risk losing her home, land, and children (Larson 2013). A woman
that wishes to report a case of domestic abuse has to undergo immense cost for medical
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procedures and filing a police report, while her case may result in no charges filed and her return
to the relationship.
Possible Shortcomings
While the project was generally successful, the post-project evaluation also finds some
possible shortcomings in the implementation of the project. The overall effectiveness of the
project was rated as good; however, some issues arose working multilaterally. Through the
project, one of the key partners in the project the NCDDR in Sierra Leone ceased to exist. This
made reconciling data especially difficult, as no institutions were present anymore (Trentmann
2010). This also further complicated the evaluation process.
The project also failed to include any monitoring process to assess issues at the beginning
of the project. Further, the project had a high financial need for personnel, training and technical
staff which is justified by the post-war situation and the need for DDR projects. The project also
did not put much emphasis on agriculture and farming and provided only little training in this.
The evaluation report recognizes that and suggests further building on training in farming so excombatants can support their livelihood. Lastly, the project recognizes the importance of women
in the DDR process; however, fails to address their role in the civil war (Trentmann 2010).
Summary
This aid project has been able to make considerable strides in terms of reintegrating and
training former soldiers to rebuild communities and the country. Specifically, the DDR project
was able to lead former soldiers into employment or establishing their own business. This project
is also important to post-conflict reconciliation and curbing future political violence by
decreasing the possibility of grievances. Reintegrating and training former soldiers decreases the
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opportunity for this group to become marginalized and experience grievances. While the project
did a good job overall, it could have done more to include women and former female soldiers.
The program retrained 2354 persons, of which only around 500 were women. Women continue
to hold a difficult place in Sierra Leonean society, with little rights and lack of enforcement
mechanisms for attained rights.
Education in Sierra Leone
Education in Sierra Leone faces many challenges partly due to the destruction of
institutions from the civil war. The Ebola virus outbreak in the country made providing
education even more difficult by decreasing the economy and national spending on education. In
2015 the economy had decreased by 21% as a result of the Ebola outbreak. Domestic revenue
declined by 10% of the GDP and inflation increased to 9.8% by the end of 2014 and further
17.4% by 2016. This has caused a decrease in overall national spending, impacting the education
sector. In 2013, the percentage of public expenditure spent on education was 2.4% of the GDP
and the amount per student around $106-150, the lowest in the West African region (World Bank
2017).
On the individual level, participation rates have decreased after the Ebola outbreak.
Socioeconomic and regional disparities continue to influence the quality of education in Sierra
Leone. The quality of education is further impacted by limited access to primary and secondary
education. While this has improved, the number of schools in Sierra Leone is still considerably
low, and many schools are private, keeping enrollment rates low (World Bank 2017). For
students that are in school, learning outcomes and retention rates are poor. 87% of first graders in
Sierra Leone are unable to read a single word and poor writing and speaking skills. Many
students also drop out of school, for instance around 52% of students dropped out of the first
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grade in 2012. Students are also plagued by gender disparities, with women being more likely to
drop out of school than men. Teacher qualifications also decrease the quality of education in
Sierra Leone. Teachers are often not trained or trained but lack the knowledge and pedagogical
skillset to mentor students (World Bank 2017). Lack of infrastructure is another issue in
education in Sierra Leone. The lack of the number of schools in Sierra Leone leads to
overcrowding and excessive student-teacher ratios. Around 50% of schools have a studentteacher ratio of 40:1 and classrooms are poorly equipped, lack textbooks and need repairs.
Nevertheless, the Sierra Leonean government has improved in terms of education,
moving from a recovery to a development phase. In 2007, Sierra Leone joined the Global
Partnership for Education starting several aid projects. The government mostly works with other
aid organizations to implement an education project. These projects mostly focus on girl’s
education, the quality of education as well as capacity building (World Bank 2017).
Hypothetical claim
To make an impact on post-conflict reconciliation and for H2 to hold to be true, the
project should rebuild the institution of education through an increase in education quality, a
number of teachers receiving training and girls receiving an education.
Aid Project in Sierra Leone on Education
The aid project of interest is a project by the World Bank to increase access to education,
enrollment rates, and learning outcomes. The project is built on recent issues with the Ebola
outbreak and the cut of national spending. The project, Revitalizing Education Development in
Sierra Leone (REDiSL), was developed by the Sierra Leonean government with the help of
several other developmental agencies such as the World Bank as part of the Global Partnership
of Education. REDiSL was founded in 2014 to support already existing framework, with a
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budget of 22million U.S dollars. The already existing framework, the Education Sector Plan
(ESP) was built on three pillars:
•

Access, equity, and completion

•

Quality and learning outcomes

•

Systems strengthening

REDiSL was created to support these pillars with the following global objectives further:
•

Fragile and post-conflict countries implement sound ESP’s

•

All girls complete primary school and in enroll in secondary school

•

The number of students mastering grade 3 literacy and numeracy skills increases

•

Improved teacher effectiveness

•

Increased volume in financing

At the time of implementation, the project was assessed to benefit over 6,000 primary schools
and 900,000 students with 50% of those being female (World Bank 2014). This is done through
three different learning goals as outline below.
Improving the learning environment and opportunities in targeted areas

This goal was targeted through performance-based school grants, programs to increase
school readiness and strengthening reading outcomes. Performance-based school grants are
projected to increase access to additional resources, increase the learning environment and
increase training for school officials. Schools must meet agreed-upon requirements and markers
to continue receiving funding, to implement a reward-based system for schools that foster quality
education. Schools are ‘judged’ by the number of days open, the amount of students in classes
and amount of classes as well as quality indicator monitoring (World Bank 2014). School
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readiness is improved through an individual project providing 50 pre-primary classrooms,
teacher training as well as available teacher resources. Reading outcomes are strengthened
through providing books for students as well as teachers, a national reading campaign and
training for teachers.
Strengthening education service delivery

This goal is designed to improve the measurement of education outcomes, establishing a
new data collection system and a sounds system of providing education. The project provides
technical coordination to analyze education assessments. This will then aid in establishing a new
data collection system. This data collection system is built on the student census that has been
carried out by the ministry with the help of the World Bank. The goal of this data collection
system is to increase the autonomy of the Sierra Leonean government in assessing education in
their country. The project also supports improving the successful delivery of education, mostly
by aiding the Nigerian government in providing and establishing assessments, improve staff
capacity and the development of budgets.
Project Success
The direct success of the project
The project was originally met with difficulties due to the Ebola outbreak, which
prompted many schools to close. The project has met several criteria and has overall increased
school performance, teachers’ skills and implemented. Overall the project had 2.3 million
beneficiaries, reopened 8,100 schools, and 44 percent of schools have met 60 percent of
performance targets (World Bank 2017). In addition, 50 pre-primary classrooms have been built,
1,350 schools are still receiving performance-based school grants, 5,970 schools have been
disinfected and have received handwashing stations post-Ebola outbreak, 36,000 handwashing
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stations have been distributed to schools. Perhaps most importantly, however, all 14 districts of
Sierra Leone benefitted from the project. The success of the project can be summarized by the
following markers:

Percentage of
schools that
meet at least
60% of
performance
% of trained
teachers using
new methods
Number of
schools
reopened
Number of
project
beneficiaries
Percentage of
female
beneficiaries

Baseline

Actual (2017)

0

60 %

End Target
(2017)
85%

0

84%

70%

0

8,100

8,100

0

1,262,515

1,230,761

0

50%

50%

Table 10: Project Baselines and Results, Source: World Bank 2017

Aid project impact on post-conflict reconciliation
While not reaching all of the target goals, this project was able to increase the quality and
accessibility of education. The project is important to consider for post-conflict reconciliation as
it increases and rebuilds the institution of education. After a civil war, the main challenge for a
state is the damage done to institutions. Therefore, strengthening these institutions can have a
positive impact on the country. Education is especially important as it prepares the future of the
country and therefore directly impacts the path the country can take. While socioeconomic and
regional disparities continue to influence the quality of education in Sierra Leone, this project is
a good step in the right direction to rebuilding this institution. The improvement of education is
mostly able to address a weakened civil society with high unemployment and former child
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soldiers needing a new place in society (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). An important factor and the
end goal of post-conflict reconciliation is curbing the emergence of political violence.
Addressing high unemployment and former child soldiers is therefore crucial to curb grievances
and relative deprivation that may arise in the future. This project is instrumental in rebuilding
institutions especially for former child soldiers and the unemployment, recognizing that most
unemployed in Sierra Leone are former child soldiers.
Possible Shortcomings
The project faced difficulties with the Ebola outbreak, causing the delay of the project by
one year. The project made up for this by increasing the disbursement amounts. In addition,
some data such as the number of teachers trained, and policy guidelines developed have not been
assessed yet as the project received additional funding in 2017, moving the closing date of the
project to 2018.
Another factor is the wide criticism of the Global Partnership on Education project. Just
like in the Global Partnership on Education project in Nigeria, possible shortcomings are
addressed by Menashy (2017). The author finds that GPE projects often fail to address private
schooling in receiving countries, which is mostly due to the number of political entities in a
multistakeholder project (Menashy 2017, 240). These political bodies then choose to
“strategically avoid” the topic of private education, to avoid institutional clashing. This further
applies to other policies that may cause clashing or disagreement, with private education
highlighting the issue (Menashy 2017, 261). This is an important factor to keep in mind which
may render the projects by the GPE less successful, in terms of achieving their goals.
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Summary
The project can be considered successful in curbing political violence and aiding in postconflict reconciliation. While the project had some difficulties with starting due to the Ebola
outbreak, it was still able to attain most of their targets and benefited all districts in Sierra Leone
(World Bank 2017). While the general structure of GPE projects has received criticism due to its
multistakeholder nature, this project was able to address problems in education in Sierra Leone.
This aid is also important in cases of public sectors such as education, as the government is still
working to rebuild this with limited funds. Lastly, the rebuilding and commitment to education in
Sierra Leone is the right direction in rebuilding institutions and making resources available for
former child soldiers and to combat unemployment. While we cannot say for certain that this will
curb violence in the end, it is more likely to as grievances are often motivators for violence.
Foreign aid is crucial in these case studies as it enables these projects to have an impact in areas
in the country that may not be the priority for the nation or that the nation is unable to fund.
Conclusion
This research aimed to understand the relationship between foreign aid and political
violence. Throughout the paper, I explored the theory of aid and aid projects being able to
alleviate some grievances that in turn cause political violence. In addition, I focused on postconflict reconciliation projects and how they can curb future cases of political violence. For the
research, I conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis further
explored my theory utilizing two different datasets. One dataset included data on the number of
attacks country-wide and regionally, foreign aid and projects in Nigeria. The other dataset also
looked at a number of attacks country-wide and regionally, foreign aid and projects in Sierra
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Leone. The qualitative analysis studied four different aid projects in Sierra Leone and Nigeria,
focusing on poverty reduction, education, and DDR.
Summary and Discussion of the Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative analysis looked at individual projects being able to improve grievances in
the individual country and turn either improving recruitment of terror cells or post-conflict
reconciliation. For the case of Nigeria, two projects were studied. One was a project on education
focused on connecting the Nigerian government and the Global Partnership for Education. This
project aimed to increase school enrollment, reading levels and equal education for both genders.
However, the project was mostly unsuccessful in achieving its pre-set goals, but should not be
completely disregarded. While the project was not able to reach its goals, it still focused
resources into Nigerian schools and established a partnership between the Nigerian government
and other world organizations to improve education. The project most likely had little influence
on recruitment for a terror organization as the project did not focus enough on Qur’anic schools,
a breeding ground for Boko Haram recruits.
The other project in Nigeria focused on poverty reduction and was implemented by the
World Bank. The project was able to implement social programs, possibly helping to curb terror
cell recruitment. The project was able to improve access of the poor to social and economic
infrastructure with 2999 micro projects. While the project is a good start to curb the recruitment
of Boko Haram, more needs to be done to strengthen the government of Nigeria. Terror
organizations involved in providing public services continues being a problem and garners them
support and recruits.
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In the case of Sierra Leone, this research studied two different projects with the goal of
post-conflict reconciliation. The first project focused on DDR and retraining former soldiers of
the Sierra Leonean civil war. This aid project has been able to make considerable strides in terms
of reintegrating and training former soldiers in an effort to rebuild communities and the country.
Specifically, the DDR project was able to lead former soldiers into employment or establishing
their own business. This project is also important to post-conflict reconciliation and curbing
future political violence by decreasing the possibility of grievances. Reintegrating and training
former soldiers decreases the opportunity for this group to become marginalized and experience
grievances. However, the project could have done more to include women and former female
soldiers. Women continue to hold a difficult place in Sierra Leonean society, with little rights
and lack of enforcement mechanisms for attained rights.
The second project focused on education in Sierra Leone. This project was also
implemented by the Global Partnership for Education. While the project had some difficulties
with starting due to the Ebola outbreak, it was still able to attain most of their targets and
benefited all districts in Sierra Leone. The project was able to rebuild education in some
communities which are an important factor for post-conflict reconciliation. The commitment to
education in Sierra Leone is the right direction in rebuilding institutions and making resources
available for former child soldiers and to combat unemployment.
Summary and Discussion of the Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis aimed to research the relationship of foreign aid on political
violence in a quantitative matter. The quantitative analysis focused on Sierra Leone shows the
increases of violent events coinciding with the intervention of ECOMOG and President Kabbah
taking back the presidency after the previous coup, removing him from power (Gberie 2005,
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111). In 1999 events decreased drastically, most likely due to the Lomé peace deal. The Lomé
peace deal was able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF,
allowing DDR programs to take into effect. From then on violent events decreased through 2002,
when the civil war officially ended.
Further, aid in Sierra Leone increased after the civil war was over, suggesting aid given
to assist in post-conflict reconciliation. The increase of aid after the war and violent events after
military interventions match with expectations for this project. This also shows that it is
worthwhile studying post-conflict reconciliation as countries give more aid.
For the study of Nigeria, the emergence of violent events coincides with the emergence
of Boko Haram and its violent spurs throughout the years. The analysis also shows clusters of
many events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. These states are Borno in the
very north, Yobe state to the left of Borno, Adamawa state underneath Borno and Plateau state.
Borno is perhaps the most important state as Boko Haram first emerged from there. In terms of
aid, transactions increased specifically around 2009, when Boko Haram’s activity increased and
became more violent. However, transactions then fluctuated throughout the years, although Boko
Haram increased their violent events with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in
2014. This is interesting to see as the expected outcome would be seeing aid increase as events
increase.
Comparison to Expectations and Limitations in this Study
Expectations for this study reflect the two hypotheses, one being that foreign aid has a
positive impact on political violence and the other being that foreign aid has a negative impact on
violence. The analysis of Sierra Leone confirmed that countries give aid after a conflict or civil
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war to further post-conflict reconciliation, confirming one of the expectations, that foreign aid
has a positive impact on violence. The case of Sierra Leone showed that the amount of aid and
projects increased after the war ended making a case for post-conflict reconciliation. The
quantitative analysis of Nigeria, however, showed that aid transactions and projects decreased
after the number of violent events increased, which did not match either narrative. Rather, this
scenario confirmed the null hypothesis of the first hypothesis stating that foreign aid does have
an impact on political violence. These further highlight two issues, one being the difficulty of the
project and assessing aid. This project does not address why countries give aid, as this is not in
the scope of this thesis and would require more research.
In the qualitative analysis, the expectations were similar. I expected to see aid projects
targeting grievances such as poverty and education or reintegrating former soldiers. The projects
in Sierra Leone were able to retrain and reintegrate former soldiers into the country, while the
projects in Nigeria had some success with providing education and poverty alleviation. These aid
projects did target grievances; however, it is difficult to assess their true impact on violence. For
one, this project does not assess the long-term effects of DDR efforts and post-conflict
reconciliation on grievances and curbing violence. Similarly, the impact of lowering poverty and
improving education cannot be assessed in the long-term either.
Implications of this Project
This project summarizes the effects of foreign aid on political violence. While this project
only studied two cases, the implications can be applied widely. This project shows that aid an
important foreign policy tool and proves its effectiveness to policymakers. Firstly, this project
displays that aid can have an impact on political violence, especially in terms of post-conflict
reconciliation. This means policymakers in another country or of a non-governmental
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organization can continue giving aid and implementing aid projects in stats that have just
suffered a conflict.
This study also proves that aid projects can be used to reduce grievances that can lead to
violence, potentially curbing violence and recruitment in the end. This is applicable globally and
not just to the two case studies as political violence has the same common motivators, as laid out
at the beginning of this paper and explained by Gurr. For policymakers this means that giving aid
with the goal of reducing or curbing violence can be succesful. However, the case study of
Nigeria shows that these aid giving countries need proper research of the country that is
supposed to receive aid and instiutionts in place. This is important to make sure grievances are
really addressed in order to have an impact on violence.
While this project only studied two cases the findings can be applied more broadly. This
project can be applied to any nation that suffers from political violence and receives foreign aid.
This raises the question why nations that experience political violence and foreign aid do not
become more peaceful. This thesis would suggest that this would be due to aid funneled into the
country without targeting the correct areas, leaving grievances to increase. This again goes to
show how important proper research is on behalf of the giving country or organization. However,
donors may also experience limitations of where aid can go or may be unwilling to send aid to
already fragile areas.
Further implications of this research are that aid projects can have a significant impact on
post-conflict reconciliation and help in rebuilding the country. This in turn then reduces
grievances, again curbing potential future violence. This can also be applied globally, as most
countries experience the same common problems after a conflict or war, mostly due to broken
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institutions. Therefore, this project can be applied broadly in the study of foreign aid on political
violence.
Further research
As laid out in the sections on limitations to this project, this project is not able to study
the short-term and long-term effects of aid and aid projects on violence. This project merely
spells out the impact aid can have on grievances, studying specific aid project and traces the
impact aid has had on violence. Current limitations include the lack of research on aid allocation
Therefore, a long-term study of violence and aid could show us how past projects have
influenced violence. This is something that could be explored with more time and could give
some clarity to the causal effects of the study.

85
Bibliography
Abdullah, Ibrahim. 2004. Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War. Dakar:
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
ACLED. 2017. “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 2017, Version
8.”
Adebayo, Bukola. 2018. “Nigeria Overtakes India in Extreme Poverty Ranking.” CNN.
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/africa/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html
Agbiboa, Daniel Egiegba. 2013. “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective.”
African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 3(1): 144.
AidData. 2017. AidDataCore_ResearchRelease_Level1_v3.1 Research Releases dataset.
Williamsburg, VA: AidData.
Ajayi, Ade. 2019. “Nigeria.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria
Akingbulu, Oluwatosin. 2018. “From Rejection to Acceptance: Quranic School in Maradun Steps up
to Integrate with Regular Education.” UNICEF.
Alesina, Alberto, and Beatrice Weder. 2002. “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?”
The American Economic Review 92(4): 1126–37.
Al-Jazeera. 2010. “Independence Day: Becoming Nigerian”.
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/africa-states
independence/2010/09/2010921124113186780.html
Azam, Jean-Paul. 1995. “How to Pay for the Peace? A Theoretical Framework with References to
African Countries.” Public Choice 83(1–2): 173–84.

86
Bezerra, Paul, and Alex R. Braithwaite. 2016. “Locating Foreign Aid Commitments in Response to
Political Violence.” Public Choice 169(3–4): 333–56.
Blomberg, S. Brock, Gregory D. Hess, and Akila Weerapana. 2004. “Economic Conditions and
Terrorism.” European Journal of Political Economy 20(2): 463–78.
Briggs, Ryan C. 2017. “Does Foreign Aid Target the Poorest?” International Organization 71(1):
187–206.
Brummel, Bill. Dir.2006. Blood Diamonds. New York City, NY: History Channel, 2006.
Documentary.
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 1997. “Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction.” Policy
Research Working Paper, no. 1937.
Campbell, John. 2019. “Nigeria Security Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations.
Carter Center. 2003. “Observing the 2002 Sierra Leone Elections”. The Carter Center Special Report
Series.
Chayes, Sarah. 2016. “Corruption and Terrorism: The Causal Link.” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/12/corruption-and-terrorismcausal-link-pub-63568.
Choi, Seung-Whan. 2010. “Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 54(6): 940–66.
Choi, Sheung-Wan, and James A. Piazza. 2014. “Ethnic Groups, Political Exclusion and Domestic
Terrorism.” Defence and Peace Economics 27(1).

87
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46(1): 13–28.
Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be
Done about It. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Comolli, Virginia. 2015. Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency. London, England: C. Hurst &
Co.
Cunningham, Kathleen, and Lee J. Seymour. 2016. “Identity Issues and Civil War: Ethnic and
Religious Divisions”. In What Do We Know About Civil Wars? Edited by Sara Mitchell and
David Mason. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Croicu, Mihai and Ralph Sundberg. 2017. “UCDP GED Codebook version 17.1”. Department of
Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Universit.
Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics 13(4): 379–99.
Dasgupta, Aditya, Kishore Gawande, and Devesh Kapur. 2017. “(When) Do Antipoverty Programs
Reduce Violence? India’s Rural Employment Guarantee and Maoist Conflict.” International
Organization 71(3): 605–32.
Dippold, Elizabeth Christine. 2016. “Evaluating the Effects of Food Aid on Conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Disaggregate Approach. Iowa State University Master Thesis.
Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2008. “The Curse of Aid.” Journal of
Economic Growth 13(3): 169–94.
Easterly, William. n.d. “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives
17(3): 23-48.

88
Esman, Milton J., and Ronald J. Herring. 2003. Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking
Development Assistance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Egbas, Jude. 2018. “Osun Now Has the Lowest Poverty Rate in Nigeria.” Pulse.
https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/osun-now-has-the-lowest-poverty-rate-in-nigeria/2d2ft0c.
Eubank, Nicholas. 2011. “Taxation, Political Accountability and Foreign Aid: Lessons from
Somaliland.” Journal of Development Studies 48(4): 465–80.
Farah, Douglas. 2003. “Foday Sankoh Dies.” Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2003/07/31/foday-sankoh-dies/6e4d2d41-d756412e-92f3-f802f9b6a91a/?utm_term=.fddab75e9534.
Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M Weinstein. 2009. “Can Development Aid
Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in PostConflict Liberia.” American Economic Review 99(2): 287–91.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American
Political Science Review 97(1): 75–90.
Felter, Claire. n.d. “Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram.” Council on Foreign Relations.
Findley, Michael G., and Joseph K. Young. 2011. “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible
Commitments.” International Studies Quarterly 55(2): 357–378
Gberie, Lansana. 2005. A Dirty War in West Africa. London: Hurst & Company.
Ghatak, Sambuddha, and Aaron Gold. 2017. “Development, Discrimination, and Domestic Terrorism:
Looking beyond a Linear Relationship.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 34(6): 618–
39.

89
Grant, Andrew. 2005. “Diamonds, Foreign Aid, and the Uncertain Prospects for Post-Conflict
Reconstruction in Sierra Leone.” UNU-WIDER.
Grossman, Herschel I. 1991. “A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections.” The American
Economic Review 81(4): 11.
Grossman, Herschel I. 1992. “Foreign aid and insurrection.” Journal of Defense Economics 3(4): 275288.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. 1st edition. Routledge.
———. 2011. “Why Men Rebel Redux: How Valid Are Its Arguments 40 Years On?” EInternational Relations (blog).
Hadjimichael M.T., D. Ghura, M. Mühleisen, R. Nord, and E. M. Uçer. 1995). “Sub-Saharan Africa:
growth, savings, and investment, 1986-93”. Occasional Paper 118, International Monetary
Fund.
Harford, Tim, and Michael Klein. 2005 “Aid and the Resource Curse.” World Bank.
Hegre, Håvard, Gudrun Østby, and Clionadh Raleigh. 2009. “Poverty and Civil War Events: A
Disaggregated Study of Liberia.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(4): 598–623.
Hippel, Karin von. 2010. “The Role of Poverty in Radicalization and Terrorism.” In Debating
Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses,
51–66. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Holpuch, Amanda. 2018. “Stolen Daughters: What Happened after #BringBackOurGirls?” The
Guardian, October 22, 2018, sec. Television & radio.

90
International Organization for Migration. 2014. “Needs Assessment in the Nigerian Education
Sector.” IOM.
Kaldor, Mary, and James Vincent. 2006. “Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected
Countries.” About Sierra Leone.” United Nations Development Programme.
Kazeem, Yomi. 2018. “Nigeria Is Set to Stay the World’s Poverty Capital for at Least a Generation.”
Quartz Africa. https://qz.com/africa/1421543/nigerias-poverty-crisis-is-worsening-oxfam-worldbank-data/.
Knack, Stephen. 2004. “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” International Studies Quarterly
48(1): 251–66.
Krueger, Alan. 2007. “What Makes a Terrorist?” European Sociological Review 26(2): 253-258.
Kuiter, Bart. 2001. “Post War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone.” European Commission on
International Cooperation and Development.
Larson, Krista. 2013. “For Women In Sierra Leone, Another Kind of Civil War.” USA Today.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/12/sierra-leone-domesticviolence/1828623/.
Li, Quan. 2005. “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 49(2): 278–97.
Lujala, Päivi. 2010. “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural
Resources.” Journal of Peace Research 47(1): 15–28.
Lyall, Jason. 2018. “Civilian Casualties, Humanitarian Aid, and Insurgent Violence in Civil Wars.”
SSRN Electronic Journal.

91
McAdams, Joseph. 2014. “Reduced Poverty in Nigeria.” The Borgen Project.
https://borgenproject.org/reduced-poverty-nigeria/.
Maiwada, Salihu, and Elisha Renne. 2013. “The Kaduna Textile Industry and the Decline of Textile
Manufacturing in Northern Nigeria.” Textile History 44(2): 171-196.
Menashy, Francine. 2017. “The Limits of Multistakeholder Governance: The Case of the Global
Partnership for Education and Private Schooling.” Comparative Education Review 61(2): 240–
68.
Mlambo, M. K., A. B. Kamara, and M. Nyende. 2009. “Financing Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa:
The Role of International Development Assistance.” Journal of African Economies 18
(Supplement 1): i53–76.
Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa.
New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Narang, Neil. 2015. “Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid Can Inadvertently Prolong Civil
War.” International Studies Quarterly 59: 184–95.
Nielsen, Richard A., Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel L. Nielson.
2011. “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict: Aid Shocks and Conflict.”
American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 219–32.
“Nigeria | UNAIDS.” n.d. UNAIDS. http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/nigeria.
Obaji Jr, Philip. n.d. “ISIS’s West African Offshoot Is Following Al Qaeda’s Rules for Success.”
Foreign Policy (blog).
OECD. 2018. “What Is ODA?” https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf.

92
Okada, Keisuke, and Sovannroeun Samreth. 2012. “The Effect of Foreign Aid on Corruption: A
Quantile Regression Approach.” Economics Letters 115(2): 240–43.
Oosterveld, Valerie. 2013. “Evaluating the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Gender Jurisprudence.”
In Charles Chernor Jalloh. The Sierra Leone Special Court and it's Legacy: The Impact for
Africa and International Criminal Law. Cambridge University Press. pp. 234–259.
Piazza, James A. 2011. “Poverty, Minority Economic Discrimination and Domestic Terrorism.”
Journal of Peace Research 48(3): 339–53.
Pigrau, Antoni. 2013. “The Environmental and Social Impact of Shell’s Operations in Nigeria.” Per
La Pau / Peace in Progress. No. 18.
Robertshawe, Mike. 2010. “Sierra Leone: A Country on the Move?”. The Sustainer, Journal of the
Royal Logistics Corps:124-5
Rohrer, Charlotte. 2018. "Can Foreign Aid Reduce the Amount of Terrorist Attacks?" Ursinus
College Summer Fellows. 7.
Savun, Burcu, and Daniel C. Tirone. 2012. “Exogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War.”
International Organization 66(3): 363–93.
Sesay, Mohamed Gibril, and Mohamed Suma. 2009. “Transitional Justice and DDR: The case of
Sierra Leone.” International Center for Transitional Justice.
“Sierra Leone.” 2018. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/sierraleone.
“Sierra Leone.” 2001. Freedom House.https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/sierraleone.

93
Sundberg, Ralph, and Erik Melander. 2013.“Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.”
Journal of Peace Research 50(4): 523-532.
Strange, Austin M, Bradley Parks, Michael J Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, and Axel Dreher. n.d.
“Tracking Under-Reported Financial Flows: China’s Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict
Nexus Revisited.”
Strandow, Daniel, Michael G. Findley, and Joseph K. Young. 2016. “Foreign Aid and the Intensity of
Violent Armed Conflict.” AidData Working Paper, no. 24.
Tahir, Nadia. 2017. “Does Aid Cause Conflict in Pakistan?” Defence and Peace Economics 28(1):
112–35.
Tavares, José. 2003. “Does Foreign Aid Corrupt?” Economics Letters 79(1): 99–106.
Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. Nielson, Darren G. Hawkins, J. Timmons Roberts, Michael G. Findley,
Ryan M. Powers, Bradley Parks, Sven E. Wilson, and Robert L. Hicks. 2011. More Dollars than
Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData. World Development
39(11): 1891-1906
The Economist. 2018. “How to Stop Countries Sliding Back into Civil War.”
https://www.economist.com/international/2018/01/18/how-to-stop-countries-sliding-back-intocivil-war.
Thomas, Abdul Rashid. 2018. “Young man killed in another wave of political violence in Sierra
Leone.” The Sierra Leone Telegraph.
“Tourism.” n.d. Cross River State Government. https://crossriverstate.gov.ng/visiting.

94
Trentmann, Claudia. 2010. “Ex-post evaluation 2010 – Brief Report”. Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).
UN ECOSOC. 2017. “United Nations Children’s Fund: Country Programme Document, Nigeria.”
UNDP. 2017. “Journey to Extremism in Africa.” United Nations Development Programme Regional
Bureau for Africa.
USAID. 2014. “Tunisia Transition Initiative Final Evaluation.”
Winters, Matthew S. 2010. “Accountability, Participation and Foreign Aid Effectiveness.”
International Studies Review 12(2): 218–43.
Wood, Reed M., and Emily Molfino. 2016. “Aiding Victims, Abetting Violence: The Influence of
Humanitarian Aid on Violence Patterns During Civil Conflict.” Journal of Global Security
Studies 1(3): 186–203.
Woods, Larry J., and Timothy R. Reese. 2008. Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a
Failed State. The Long War Series. Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press, US
Army Combined Arms Center.
World Bank. 2018. “Gross Domestic Product Per Capita for Sierra Leone.” FRED, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. January 1, 1960.
World Bank. 2014. “Sierra Leone – Revitalizing Education Development in Sierra Leone.”
World Bank. 2014. “Project Appraisal Document on a proposed Global Partnership for Education
Fund and MDTF Grant to the Republic of Sierra Leone.”
World Bank. 2015. “Project Appraisal Document on a proposed Global Partnership for Education
Grant to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”

95
World Bank. 2017. “International Development Association project paper on a proposed additional
credit to the Republic of Sierra Leone.”
World Bank. 2014. “Project Performance Assessment Report, Federal Government of Nigeria,
Community Based Poverty Reduction Project.”
World Bank. 2018. “Nigeria Partnership for Education Project.”

96
Appendix
Nigeria’s History and Violent Extremism
To understand political violence in Nigeria today, one must look at Nigeria’s history and
violent extremism in the past. When studying violent extremism in Nigeria, it is important to
consider ethnic tensions and political context as well as religion (Comolli 2015, 11). Up until the
nineteenth century, northern Nigeria used to be dominated by city-states and kingdoms largely
composed of Hausa elite. Hausa is an ethnic group in Nigeria. However, wars were the norm as
kings constantly tried to increase their empire. The rulers of the Hausaland converted to Islam
predating Christianity in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 12). Usman Dan Fodio is considered to be the
founder of Islam in Nigeria and helped spread Islam across the northern region of Nigeria by
declaring jihad against infidels in 1804. Today, he still an important figure in Nigeria and serves
as inspiration for many groups. For instance, Boko Haram declared in a letter in 2011 that they
strive to bring back the memory and legacy of Dan Fodio (Comolli 2015, 13-14). Dan Fodio
belonged to the Fulani that eventually moved to Hausaland; he then became a widely respected
figure in his ethnic group alongside his group, the Qadiriyya Brotherhood. He gained trust and
support in the states Katsina, Kebbi, and Zamfara. The government of Nigeria and extremist
groups then first came in contact when the King Yunfa took the Gobir throne in 1801 and
decided to persecute and exile the Fulani. Gobir is the former name of Nigeria, as it was still
evolving and found to be a city-state (Comolli 2015, 13). Dan Fodio and his followers moved to
Gudu and began an opposition. Later on, Dan Fodio was elected Amir al-Mumiriin which led to
political power (Comolli 2015, 14). Eventually, this led to King Yunfa and Dan Fodio beginning
a feud with Fodio starting a guerrilla warfare.
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Dan Fodio and the Fulani people then began attacking the Hausa, fed up with oppression,
high taxes and violations of Sharia law such as the permission of alcohol. In 1809 Hausa kings
were ousted, and Fodio became the first Sultan of Sokoto Caliphate in Gobir (Comolli 2015, 15).
Today the caliph of Sokoto remains a popular and leading figure, one whose support is sought by
the Nigerian government. Dan Fodio then extended his jihad covering areas under control as far
as Bauchi, Nupe, and Yoruba. Today the Hausa and Fulani are known as the Hausa-Fulani as
they joined forces when they both shared a common religion. They make up 30% of Nigeria’s
population, and Hausa is the most common spoken language (Comolli 2015, 16). When the
British colonized Nigeria, decided to leave the Fulani alone, as they were scared of resistance.
This allowed them to expand their empire (Comolli 2015, 16-17). After the colonial rule was
over in 1960 most positions in the government were given to the Igbos. Then, in 1966 an
attempted coup d’etat resulted in the killing of two prominent northern leaders, which resulted in
an Igbo, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi becoming president. Northern soldiers then launched a countercoup, and Igbo’s living in the North became isolated. In 1967, Ojukwu, the governor of the
southeast declared the Republic of Biafra, a newly independent country. A war erupted, between
the Nigerian government with the help of British forces against weakened Biafran people. The
war also impoverished many and led to a famine that led to 2 million Biafrans dying (Comolli
2015, 16-18).
Religious and ethnic tensions have continued since Nigeria’s independence in October
1960. Wole Soyinka, a Nigerian Nobel Peace Laureate has said, "I consider myself a Yoruba
before I'm a Nigerian. That is my immediate instant identity. And I think most intellectuals will
say the same thing, and politicians. However, here we are together, brought together by the
British. They are operating the same constitution. A new identity which supervenes the various
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ethnic nationalities is born” (al-Jazeera 2010). Despite Soyinka’s optimism, rival ethnic, regional
and religious identities have contributed to violence and instability, as Nigeria alternated
between democracy and military rule since independence (al-Jazeera 2010). Regional, religious
and ethnic leaders competed for control of the state and the power and resources that came with
it, as when efforts by Igbo leaders in the oil-rich southeastern region of Nigeria to secede sparked
a bloody civil war in 1967 (al-Jazeera 2010). The mixture of poor job prospects as well as
poverty with ethnic disparities and exclusions have shown to heavily correlate with successful
recruitment and individual motivation in Africa (UNDP 2017, 55). Today, scholars argue that the
people living in the North in Nigeria may fall back onto sharia law and education as they view
the state as a failure as well as its education system (Comolli 2015, 18-19).
Background on Boko Haram or Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati w’al Jihad
Beginnings in Borno state under Lawan and Yusuf
Boko Haram’s origin can be traced back to 1995 at the University of Maiduguri, Borno
state, where a Muslim leader, Lawan, set up a Muslim youth organization. This organization was
built around a conservative non-violent movement. However, in 2002, Lawan left, and
Mohammed Yusuf was appointed the leader of the sect (Comolli 2015, 45-47). The first oust of
violence then emerged in 2003 when public buildings and police stations were attacked in Yobe.
It is unclear what lead to this, but the existing political sphere could have contributed including
the re-election of Christian President Obasanjo in 2003 (Comolli 2015, 50). The widely accepted
origin of Boko Haram is said to be that the youth was fed up with corruption around them which
prompted them to move to Yobe and set up a base there, named “Afghanistan.” New members
arrived from other countries, such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. After increased military
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strikes against Boko Haram in Yobe, they returned to Borno. Boko Haram then began to expand
their reach into Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger after returning to Borno (Comolli 2015, 50-51).
Eventually Boko Haram gained power through Boko Haram members being sitting
members of city councils, setting up a “state within a state” with police and cabinet. Yusuf also
set up a mosque for the youth, named after known Salafist Taymiyyah. Salafism is a form of
Sunni Islam, characterized by the notion that Islam should be rid of non-Muslim influences. The
name Boko Haram can be translated to “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa. However,
this name was popularized by the media, members of Boko Haram call the sect Jama’atu Ahlis
Sunnah Lidda’awati w’al Jihad (Comolli 2015, 51). In 2009, Boko Haram declared that they do
not reject Western education per se but Western civilization. This means that Western culture is
rejected and Islamic ways of life reinforced. From 2004 to 2008 Boko Haram stayed mostly
dormant with the exception of a major initiative in 2007. This period shaped Boko Haram, with
reports of training under al-Qaeda officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as receiving
funds from al-Qaeda to target Americans in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 51). Yusuf continued his
teachings, amassing an impressive following. This following grew, as he created a system of
informal social welfare, setting up microfinancing systems (Comolli 2015, 52).
A shift in leadership
Then in 2009, Boko Haram re-emerged, and their tactics changed soon after. In 2009,
tensions were heightened due to a confrontation between Boko Haram members and officers
belonging to Operation Flush. This operation was tasked with robberies and enforcing the
wearing of helmets. On June 11, 2009, Boko Haram members were traveling to a funeral when
the officer stopped the procession asking them to put on helmets. After refusing, violence broke
out between the officers and sect member (Comolli 2015, 53). Boko Haram then declared the
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state as their enemy, and the state began to crack down on Boko Haram. Many members were
arrested, firearms and explosives were seized. Boko Haram then retaliated and attacked a police
station in Bauchi in which 50 people died. The police then attacked the base near the Bauchi
airstrip. Violence then spread to Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe with more than 100 causalities
in one day (Comolli 2015, 53-55).
The government then deployed the army to crack down on Boko Haram. Many locals
were displaced, and Yusuf, as well as his then deputy Shekau, were arrested. Yusuf then died in
custody of the government; however the circumstances are debated. The police claim that he
tried to escape and was killed during this, while others say that he died during police questioning
(Comolli 2015, 58-60). Witnesses report that Yusuf and other Boko Haram members were shot
as the police lacked confidence in the judicial system of Nigeria. The, between August 2009 and
April 2010, the group was believed extinct. In 2010 Abubakar Shekau took over, starting a new,
more violent period of Boko Haram (Comolli 2015, 63). Boko Haram then widened their targets
and began attacking institutions associated with democracy such as polling places but also
schools, bars, hospitals, mosques, and prisons. After 2012, the group Jama’atu Ansaril
Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan criticized Boko Haram for the killing of Muslims, stating that the
Qur’an forbids the killing of innocent people. The group then declared that they would be ready
to fight any group that targeted Muslims. Eventually, many groups splintered off from Boko
Haram, continuing to operate in Nigeria and neighboring countries such as Cameroon and Chad
(Comolli 2015, 63-70).
Sierra Leone’s History and the Diamond Trade
Sierra Leone is a small West African state that began as a settlement for freed slaves sent
by the British government. The small area was called Freetown, however quickly experienced
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conflict, disease and food shortage forcing the freed Blacks to work for slave traders. This fueled
abolitionists and caused Freetown to become Britain’s first colony. Britain then infused the
country with freed Blacks from Jamaica and North America. Eventually the mix of early settlers
and freed Blacks came to be known as Creole. The rest of Sierra Leone as we know it today
became a British protectorate along with Freetown. The constitution of 1924 brought all of Sierra
Leone together as a political unit with unicameral legislature with the colony and protectorate
represented in the same chamber. The protectorate was allocated more seats which heightened
tensions; this struggle saw the emergence of two political parties, the National Council of Sierra
Leone for the colony and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) for the protectorate. The SLPP
eventually gained majority control with the backing of protectorate educated people, forcing the
colonial authorities to introduce the constitution of 1951. This constitution gave the protectorate
majority control, making SLPP leader Milton Margai prime minister.
The country then became independent under Margai in 1961. The years directly before
and after independence were marked by violence. Before independence the oppressiveness of
chiefs in the Northern province led to riots and protests, other protests were directed at the
corrupt government, directly targeting future prime ministers Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens.
In both instances, the army responded resulting in deaths. The development of diamonds as a
natural resource in Sierra Leone also changed the political landscape. Commercial exploitation
first started in 1931 by British companies. Diamonds soon came to dominate Sierra Leone’s
economy. Siaka Stevens became prime minister in 1967, however before he was a minister of
mines in the Margai regime. Through this position, Stevens was able to grant government status
to all mines. After Milton Margai’s death, his younger brother Albert Margai became prime
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minister of Sierra Leone, much to the disliking of other ethnic groups and Stevens. In 1967
Stevens won the election.
However, a coup led by David Lansana took over the government. A day after the coup,
he was unseated by the National Reformation Council (NRC) which was in turn unseated by
junior soldiers who returned the government to Stevens. In 1968. Lansana was later charged with
treason and executed. Stevens was then able to reduce the opposition in parliament through
declaring a state of emergencies, arresting the opposition and fraudulent election petitions. In
1977, Stevens became prime minister again, after heavily fraudulent elections. In 1978, Stevens
had a bill declaring Sierra Leone a one-party state passed. In fear of the army, Stevens starved
the army of its resources and created his army the Internal Security Division, which later came to
be a tool to intimidate political opponents. Heads of all-important institutions in Sierra Leone
were political appointees backing Stevens. Stevens soon became greedy and involved in illegal
diamond mining with the Lebanese community in Sierra Leone. He later nationalized the
diamond trade, with a 12% share just for himself. The government neglected much of rural
Sierra Leone, causing a high infant mortality rate, malaria, and undernourished children. In 1985,
Stevens handed Sierra Leone over to his successor, Joseph Momoh. Momoh’s regime was
comprised of the same people as Stevens’ regime. However, in 1987 Momoh arrest most of them
under coup suspicions. In the 1990s resistance against the Momoh state and one-party state
gained momentum.
Background on the Revolutionary United Front
Beginnings of Foday Sankoh
The beginnings of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) start with Foday Sankoh, a
soldier in the Sierra Leonean army. During the 20th century, the army was widely unpopular,
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mainly due to its ties with colonial oppression. The army was used to ensure compliance in
Sierra Leone. Sankoh was in the army when Lansana staged the coup against Stevens but did not
play any role in it. Sankoh has however claimed to have been part of the junior soldier group
who unseated the NRC and returned the regime to Stevens. In 1971, another coup of the Stevens
regime was attempted, this time supported by Sankoh. Sankoh was later arrested for failing to
report the planning of the coup (Gberie 2005, 42).
Exactly twenty years after the failed second coup, on March 23, 1991, Sankoh
announced the launch of a people’s armed struggle to overthrow the oppressive Momoh regime.
This came after Sankoh had moved to Bo, the most important center of dissidents in Sierra
Leone. There Sankoh became involved with the Pan African Union, which had been started by
university lecturers of the Fourah Bay College. These lecturers had partaken in protests against
the Stevens regime in 1977, which led to violence and eventually another rigged re-election of
Stevens. While this group did not constitute the emergence of the RUF, some of its members
later joined the RUF. An important turn in the story of the RUF happened with the Sierra
Leonean government boycotting Gaddafi’s hosting of the annual Organization of African Union
meeting. In response, Gaddafi channeled funds to regime critical university students. A Green
Book Study Group was started propagandising Gaddafi’s political ideas, and soon after
demonstrations were started at the Fourah Bay College. The group then recruited more people
including Sankoh and received training in Libya. However, the group soon died down. The only
members that would not give up were Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Rashid Mansaray. While the trio’s
attempts died down as well. Sankoh was invited by Gaddafi to train in his Benghazi camp. In this
camp, Gaddafi trained government dissidents from all the countries he did not politically agree
with. In this camp, Sankoh met Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor needed a base to forge his war in
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Liberia. After being turned down and arrested by the Momoh regime, Taylor came to Sankoh.
Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Mansaray then joined Taylor in Burkina Faso and in the attempt to
overthrow the Liberian government.
The RUF and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
With the war in Liberia taking on ethnic dimensions, ethnic groups either rallied behind
the NPFL or the original Doe regime (Gberie 2005, 56). Many died through the war mostly
targeted due to their ethnicity. The Doe regime was on the verge of collapse with NPFL forces
capturing the capital, Monrovia. By the same time, tough, the NPFL had split with a new group
emerging. This new group was led by Prince Johnson and called the Independent National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). This war caused a massive exodus of people into countries
such as Sierra Leone. At the same time ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African
States put together an intervention group, ECOMOG. President Doe and some of his military had
barricaded themselves in the presidential palace, fighting Taylor’s forces on the one hand and
Johnson’s on the other. Johnson then captured Doe in front of ECOMOG troops, torturing and
killing him. As a result, Charles Taylor felt cheated of capturing Doe and vowed to attack
Freetown’s international airport in response (Gberie 2005, 58). In 1991, Sankoh announced that
President Momoh should resign or face an armed rebellion. The RUF war began on 23 March
1991, when rebels attacked two border towns in Sierra Leone. The government of Sierra Leone
quickly blamed the attacks on Charles Taylor, ignoring Sankoh. However, Sankoh made sure he
would not be ignored, capturing towns in the Kailahun district (Gberie 2005, 60).
The Sierra Leonean Civil War
At first, the Sierra Leonean army only arrived later, after the RUF had already attacked
towns. However, after Guinea and Nigeria supported Sierra Leone with troops, the army went on
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the offensive towards the end of 1991. While the forces were still widely effective, they quickly
gained more support with the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (Ulimo). Ulimo was
created in Sierra Leone by former soldiers of the Doe army. They launched an offensive against
the RUF, successfully taking back Pujehun district and pushing the RUF back into Liberia
(Gberie 2005, 64). While Ulimo fought in Liberia “at the doorstep of Taylor,” Guinean and
Sierra Leonean forces were fighting a stalemate in Sierra Leone. This stalemate caused Momoh
to changes his political stance, signing a multiparty constitution. Corruption of funds eventually
caused front-line soldiers to go without pay, prompting a coup led by Solomon Musa. They
formed a junta called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) with Valentine Strasser
as the new leader (Gberie 2005, 68).
The NPRC promised to end the war quickly and stopped all programs artificially creating
product scarcity, which made them popular fast. The newly formed government then comprised
new volunteer forces, largely made up of youths that had lost their families at the hands of the
RUF. By 1993, over 1,000 young boys mostly under age fifteen were enlisted in the army. After
human rights organizations denounced this, the NPRC announced that these groups were to be
demobilized (Gberie 2005, 77). In 1992, the RUF captured the biggest mining town in the
country, Gandorhun. After the army recaptured the town, they began punishing anyone helping
the RUF. This led to imprisonment, torture, and killings at the hands of the Sierra Leonean army.
The regime further murdered twenty citizens, including a pregnant woman in 1992 due to
allegations of plotting a coup. By the end of 1993, the Sierra Leonean government had
recaptured major land, causing Strasser to announce a ceasefire and calling for remaining rebels
to surrender.
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However, only a month later the war escalated. Many soldiers had either left their posts
watching a major soccer game or had felt betrayed by the NPRC, joining the RUF. This coined
the term of sobels, soldiers by day and rebels by night. Disloyalty to the military further
deteriorated the war and caused major problems. The corrupt NPRC army dismantled and killed
many volunteer soldiers that fought the RUF, including the Kamajoisia (Gberie 2005, 84).
However, Deputy Minister of Defence, Hinga Norman was able to keep the Kamajoisia alive and
give them a more important role in the military. In 1996, the Kamajoisia were able to capture
Zogoda, the RUF’s last remaining stronghold at the time. Military members, as well as RUF
members, also engaged in terrorist attacks throughout the country. In 1996 Strasser was also
overthrown. Eventually, Ahmad Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party comes to power in
1996 after his victory in the presidential election. While Kabbah was quickly removed from
power by his military, ECOMOG led by Nigeria reinstated order and Kabbah resumed power in
1998 (Gberie 2005, 111).
ECOMOG quickly became the governments only defense, with the Sierra Leonean army
largely dismantling and partly joining the RUF. While ECOMOG was able to overtake
Freetown on behalf of the government, more rural areas were harder to overtake. In 1999 Nigeria
was bound to recall their ECOMOG forces which caused diplomatic missions to intervene,
coming to the Lomé peace accord (Abdullah 2004). The Lomé peace accord was signed in July
of 1999 and pardoned Sankoh for treason, gave him a transitional position in the government as a
form of Vice President as well as a position overseeing the mining fields. The peace accord was
also conditional on the RUF dismantling arms (Abdullah 2004, 138). After the signing of the
peace accord, many rebels refused to give up arms. As a result, Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration (DDR) camps were set up allowing rebels to exchange weapons for food,
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shelter, and training in new skills (Gberie 2005, 163). The camps proved much more successful
and effective post-2000.
Alongside the Lomé peace accord and DDR camps, the United Nations sent
peacekeeping forces. The United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was there to
assist the peace accord and brought a serious amount of troops (Woods and Reese 2008).
However, the troops brought controversy with them as well, with the head of the UNAMISL
troop accusing Nigerian army forces of illegal mining. While UNAMSIL troops were deployed
in Sierra Leone, Russian forces also helped out with troops and helicopters, and the British army
intervened as well. In 2000, the British forces helped UNAMSIL from the brink of collapse and
re-established order. This was an important break at the end of the civil war, as they stabilized
the situation, took back the main parts of Sierra Leone and triggered an additional ceasefire
(Gberie 2005, 176). Further, Guinean troops helped push back RUF troops, and a UN resolution
demanded the Liberian government to stop working with the RUF (Gberie 2005, 177). On
January 18, 2002, President Kabbah declared the war officially over.

